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Sound and Fury: 




For about twenty years, Deidre McCloskey has campaigned to convince the economics 
profession that it is hopelessly confused about statistical significance.  She argues that many 
practices associated with significance testing are bad science and that most economists 
routinely employ these bad practices:  “Though to a child they look like science, with all that 
really hard math, no science is being done in these and 96 percent of the best empirical 
economics. . .” (McCloskey 1999).  McCloskey’s charges are analyzed and rejected.  That 
statistical significance is not economic significance is a jejune and uncontroversial claim, and 
there is no convincing evidence that economists systematically mistake the two.  Other 
elements of McCloskey’s analysis of statistical significance are shown to be ill-founded, and 
her criticisms of practices of economists are found to be based in inaccurate readings and 
tendentious interpretations of their work.  Properly used, significance tests are a valuable tool 
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1. The Sin and the Sinners 
For twenty years, since the publication of the first edition of The Rhetoric of Economics (1985a), 
Deirdre (né  Donald) N. McCloskey has campaigned tirelessly to convince the economics 
profession that it is deeply confused about statistical significance.
1  We beg to differ.  Economic 
and statistical significance are different, but we do not believe that there is any convincing 
evidence that economists systematically mistake the two.  And we believe that McCloskey’s 
wider argument that many of the practices associated with significance testing are bad science 
are ill-founded, and her criticisms of practices of economists are found to be based in inaccurate 
readings and tendentious interpretations of their work.   
  With the zeal of a radio preacher, McCloskey (2002) declares the current practice of 
significance testing to be one of the two deadly “secret sins of economics”:   
The progress of science has been seriously damaged.  You can’t believe anything that 
comes out of the Two Sins [tests of statistical significance and qualitative theorems].  Not 
a word.  It is all nonsense, which future generations of economists are going to have to do 
all over again.  Most of what appears in the best journals of economics is unscientific 
rubbish. [p. 55] 
 
. . . 
 
Until economics stops believing . . . that an intellectual free lunch is to be gotten from . . . 
statistical significance . . . our understanding of the economic world will continue to be 
crippled by the spreading, ramifying, hideous sins. [p. 57] 
 
As well as contributing to a debate internal to the profession, McCloskey engaged a wider 
audience.  She has decried the sins of economics in the pages of Scientific American (McCloskey 
1995a, b) and in a contribution to a series of tracts aimed at “anthropology . . . other academic 
disciplines, the arts, and the contemporary world” (McCloskey 2002, endpaper).  Her attacks on 
applied economists have been widely reported inter alia in the Economist (2004).   
  In perhaps the most influential of McCloskey’s many tracts, she and her coauthor 
characterize the main point as “a difference can be permanent . . . without being ‘significant’ in 
other senses . . . [a]nd . . . significant for science or policy and yet be insignificant statistically . . 
. [McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, p. 97].  To avoid any misapprehension, let us declare at the outset 
that we accept the main point without qualification:  a parameter or other estimated quantity may 
                                                 
1 Other writings on this topic include the second edition of The Rhetoric (McCloskey 1998) as well as McCloskey 
(1985b, 1992, 1994, 1995a, b, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2005), McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher (1984), McCloskey and 
Stephen T. Ziliak (1996), and Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, b).   
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be statistically significant and, yet, economically unimportant or it may be economically 
important and statistically insignificant.  Our point is the simple one that, while the economic 
significance of the coefficient does not depend on the statistical significance, our certainty about 
the accuracy of the measurement surely does.   
  But McCloskey’s charges go well beyond this truism.  On the one hand, she charges that 
significance testing is mired in sin:  many practices associated with significance testing are bad 
science.  On the other hand, she charges that economist are, by and large, sinners – not only 
mistaking statistical significance for economic significance, but routinely committing the full 
range of sins associated with significance testing.  The observation that statistical significance is 
not economic significance is jejune and uncontroversial.  We have been unable to locate 
anywhere in McCloskey’s voluminous writings on this point a citation to even a single 
economist who defends the contrary notion that statistical significance demonstrates economic 
importance.  The assertion that the mistake is commonplace is used to add buoyancy to an 
otherwise unsustainable bill of particulars against common statistical methods and the 
economists who use them.   
  McCloskey offers three principal methodological charges against significance testing.   
First, as the title of Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a) puts it, “size matters.”  A coefficient that is 
estimated to have economically large size, even if it is statistically insignificant, cannot properly 
be neglected.   
  Second, McCloskey adopts a Neyman-Pearson statistical framework without 
qualification.  Applied economists, she argues, are failures as scientists since they do not specify 
precisely the hypotheses that they regard as alternative to their null hypothesis and because they 
do not specify a loss function:   
No test of significance that does not examine the loss function is useful as science 
. . . Thus unit root tests that rely on statistical significance are not science.  Neither are tests 
of the efficiency of financial markets that rely on statistical instead of financial 
significance.  Though to a child they look like science, with all that really hard math, no 
science is being done in these and 96 percent of the best empirical economics. . .   
[McCloskey 1999, p. 361]  
 
It is not just that economists do not examine loss functions, McCloskey charges that they 
generally ignore type II error and the power of tests.  Furthermore, the fixation on 5 percent (or 
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other conventional test sizes) is a sign of not taking the trade off between size and power 
seriously. 
  Third, McCloskey argues that even the Neyman-Pearson framework has only a limited 
application in economics.  It is, she believes, appropriate only when “sampling error is the 
scientific issue (which it is commonly not . . .)” (McCloskey 1999, p. 361).  In general, she 
leaves the strong impression that tests of statistical significance have next-to-no place in 
economics for a variety of reasons.  Test are appropriate only when the data are a proper sample 
and not when they constitute the whole population.  Yet, in most cases, especially when time 
series are involved, McCloskey maintains that the economist deals with a population or, worse, a 
sample of convenience (McCloskey 1985a, pp. 161, 167; 1985b, p. 203; McCloskey and Ziliak 
1996, p. 112).  Acknowledging McCloskey as the source of their maintained hypothesis, Hugo 
A. Keuzenkamp and Jan R. Magnus (1995, pp. 20-21) famously challenged economists to 
produce a clear-cut example of a case in which a significance test has ever been decisive with 
respect to an important economic hypothesis (McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, pp. 111-112; and 
Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, p. 543, cf. Lawrence H. Summers 1991).   
  In using significance tests in spite of their methodological flaws, McCloskey believes that 
economics has compromised its scientific stature.  McCloskey argues that, because of its use of 
significance tests, economics has become, to use Richard P. Feynman’s (1985, pp. 308-317) 
analogy, a “cargo cult science.”  Anthropologists are said to have observed after World War II 
that certain Pacific islanders built straw radio huts and other replicas of military facilities in the 
hope that, by mimicking the forms of military activity, the aircraft would return with food, drink, 
and other modern goods as they had during the war.  McCloskey (2002, pp. 55-56) means to 
echo Feynman’s criticism of pseudo-sciences, implying that in using significance tests 
economists mimic the outward forms, rather than the substance, of science:  real sciences do not 
use significance testing.   
  Finally, McCloskey claims that, not only that significance testing is a methodological sin, 
but also that economists are willing sinners, McCloskey charges that the training of economists 
in statistics and econometrics is negligent for not stressing the distinction between economic and 
statistical significance sufficiently.  The principal evidence offered with respect to training is an 
analysis of statistics and econometrics textbooks.  To demonstrate that the practices of applied 
economists betray a deep confusion about statistical significance, McCloskey relies on two 
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surveys of articles from the American Economic Review – one for the 1980s (McCloskey and 
Ziliak 1996) and one for the 1990s (Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a).  The surveys consist of 
nineteen questions (see Table 1) scored so that “yes” represents good practice and “no” bad 
practice.  
  We reiterate that we accept that statistical significance is not economic significance.  No 
doubt there are cases of people mistaking one for the other.  Yet, the evidence that this mistake is 
widespread and systematic is very weak.  In the following sections, we refute McCloskey’s 
principal arguments.  In section 2, we begin with a brief review of the rationale for significance 
testing, and then go on to consider and reject her methodological case against tests of statistical 
significance.  In section 3, we show that most physical and life sciences – including physics – do 
in fact widely use tests of statistical significance.  In section 4, we show that that McCloskey’s 
evidence for the view that econometrics textbooks mislead economics students is weak.  In 
section 5, we demonstrate that the design of McCloskey and Ziliak’s surveys of the practices of 
economists is deeply flawed.  We show further that McCloskey and Ziliak’s analysis of 
particular papers misrepresents them so thoroughly that it undermines all confidence in the 
surveys themselves.  Finally, we conclude that McCloskey’s evidence that economists routinely 
confuse economic and statistical significance, or typically engage in unsupportable statistical 
practices, is unconvincing.  Significance tests, properly used, are a tool for the assessment of 
signal strength and not measures of economic significance.  By and large, economists use them 
this way.   
 
 
2. Statistical Practice:  Good or Bad? 
2.1 THE LOGIC OF SIGNIFICANCE TESTS 
At the risk of laboring the familiar, we set the stage with a review of the logic of significance 
tests.  The test of statistical significance has a venerable history (see Stephen M. Stigler 1986, 
1999).  Most applications fall under two related types.  The first type asks whether two sample 
moments could have been drawn from populations with the same distribution.  Francis Ysidro 
Edgeworth (1885, pp. 187-188) provides an early example: 
In order to detect whether the difference between two proposed Means is or is not 
accidental, form the probability-curve under which the said difference, supposing it were 
accidental, would range.  Consider whether the difference between the observed Means 
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Table 1 
Survey Questions from McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) and 
Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a) 
 
  1. Does the paper use a small number of observations, such that statistically significant 
differences are not found at the conventional levels merely by choosing a large number of 
observations. (Use a small number of observations, such that statistically significant 
differences are not found merely by choosing a very large sample?) 
  2. Are units and descriptive statistics for all regressions included?  (Report descriptive 
statistics for regression  variables?) 
  3. Are coefficients reported in elasticity form, or in some interpretable form relevant to the 
problem at hand and consistent with economic theory, so that readers can discern the 
economic impact of regressors?  (Report coefficients in elasticities, or in some other 
useful form that addresses the question of “how large is large”?) 
  4. Are proper nulls specified? (Test the null hypotheses that the authors said were the ones 
of interest?) 
  5. Are coefficients carefully interpreted? (Carefully interpret the theoretical meaning of the 
coefficients? For example, does it pay attention to the details of the units of measurement, 
and to the limitations of the data?) 
6. Does the paper eschew reporting all t- or F-statistics or standard errors, regardless of 
whether a significance test is appropriate?  (Eschew reporting all standard errors, t- , p-, 
and F- statistics, when such information is irrelevant?) 
  7. Is statistical significance at the first use, commonly the scientific crescendo of the paper, 
the only criterion of “importance”?  (At its first use, consider statistical significance to be 
one among other criteria of importance?) 
  8. Does the paper mention the power of the tests?  (Consider the power of the test?)  
  9. If the paper mentions power, does it do anything about it?  (Examine the power function?) 
10. Does the paper eschew “asterisk econometrics,” that is ranking the coefficients according 
to the absolute size of t-statistics.  (Eschew “asterisk econometrics,” the  ranking of 
coefficients according to the absolute value of the test statistic?) 
11. Does the paper eschew “sign econometrics,” that is, remarking on the sign but not the 
size of the coefficients?  (Eschew “sign econometrics,” remarking on the sign but not the 
size of the coefficient?) 
12. Does the paper discuss the size of the coefficients?  (Discuss the size of the coefficients?)   
            continued  next  page 
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Table 1 continued 
13. Does the paper discuss the scientific conversation within which a coefficient would be 
judged “large” or “small”?  (Discuss the scientific conversation within which a coefficient 
would be judged large or small?) 
14. Does the paper avoid choosing variables for inclusion solely on the basis of statistical 
significance?  (Avoid choosing variables for inclusion solely on the basis of statistical 
significance?) 
15. After the crescendo, does the paper avoid using statistical significance as the criterion of 
importance?  (Use other criteria of importance besides statistical significance after the 
crescendo?) 
16. Is statistical significance decisive, the conversation stopper, conveying the sense of 
ending?  (Consider more than statistical significance decisive in an empirical argument?) 
17. Does the paper ever use a simulation (as against a use of the regression as an input into 
further argument) to determine whether the coefficients are reasonable?  (Do a simulation 
to determine whether the coefficients are reasonable?) 
18. In the “conclusions” and “implications” sections, is statistical significance kept separate 
from economic policy, and scientific significance?  (In the conclusions, distinguish 
between statistical and economic significance?) 
19. Does the paper avoid using the word “significance” in ambiguous ways, meaning 
“statistically significant” in one sentence and “large enough to matter for policy or 
science” in another?  (Avoid using the word “significance” in ambiguous ways?) 
 
Notes:  The questions in upright font are verbatim quotations from McCloskey and Ziliak’s (1996, pp. 101-
104) description of their survey instrument.  The parenthetical questions in italic font are their capsule 
summaries from Table 1 (p. 105).  Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, Table 1, p. 529) refer only to the 
capsule summaries with inconsequential differences in wording from the earlier survey. Hoover and Siegler, “McCloskey and Significance Testing in Economics” 
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exceeds two or three times the modulus of that curve.  If it does, the difference is not 
accidental.  For example, in order to determine whether the observed difference between 
the mean stature of 2,315 criminals and the mean stature of 8,585 British adult males 
belonging to the general population is significant, we form the curve according to which 
the difference between the mean of a random selection of 2,315 and 8,585 mean fluctuates.  
And we shall find that the observed difference between the proposed Means, namely about 
2 (inches) far exceeds thrice the modulus of that curve, namely 0.2.  The difference 
therefore “comes by cause.”  
 
Edgeworth’s strategy is exactly the same as used with a modern significance test.  His “modulus” 
is just a rescaling of the standard deviation:   × 2 the standard deviation (see Stigler (1986, pp. 
310-311).  Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p. 531) advise “the profession [to] adopt the standards 
set forth 120 years ago by Edgeworth . . .,” but those standards are simply the ones in common 
use today, only more stringent (cf. Joel L. Horowitz 2004, p. 552).  Stigler remarks that twice the 
modulus, Edgeworth’s threshold for statistical significance corresponds to a two-sided test with a 
size of 0.005, “a rather exacting test.”
2
  Edgeworth’s testing strategy is the same one used today when the question is whether 
two distributions are the same:  on the assumption that the data conform to a particular 
probability distribution (such as the normal) or can through some transformation be made to do 
so, compute the distribution under the null hypothesis that the moments are the same and reject 
the null if the actual difference falls in the tail of the distribution as determined by a critical 
                                                 
2 Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, pp. 530-531) completely misread Edgeworth, when they attempt to enlist him as an 
ally.  It is Jevons who takes the position that “size matters,” and Edgeworth who argues that we must attend to 
statistical significance.  Yes, Edgeworth distinguishes between economic and statistical significance, but Ziliak and 
McCloskey miss his point when they assert that he corrects Jevons for ignoring an economically, as opposed to a 
statistically, significant difference of 3 or 4 percent in the volume of commercial bills in different quarters.  
Edgeworth (1885, p. 208) writes:  “Professor Jevons must be understood to mean that such a difference may for 
practical purposes be neglected.  But for the purposes of science, the discovery of a difference in condition, a 
difference of 3 per cent. and much less may well be important.”  Edgeworth did not dispute Jevons’s judgment that 3 
to 4 percent is economically small or criticize him for it.  Rather he argued that science may care about differences 
that are not of practical (i.e., economic) importance.  To underwrite that view, he conducted a test of statistical 
significance:  after correcting for a secular increase in the volume of bills, he found that the means of the first and 
second quarters differed by an amount equal to about 0.8 times the modulus ( 5 . 10 / 5 . 2 8 . 0 = ) or, in modern 
terminology, by 1.1 standard deviations.  Edgeworth concluded:  “There is, therefore, ‘no great difference,’ as 
Professor Jevons says; still a slight indication of a real law – enough to require the continuation of the inquiry, if the 
subject repaid the trouble.”  Far from contradicting Jevons on the matter of economic importance, Edgeworth found 
that the differences were not statistically significant by his usual standard of two to three times the modulus; 
nevertheless, the result, he believed, was significant enough that it might encourage economic scientists to 
investigate further, even if it would not repay the trouble of a practical man.  His caveat about a slight indication of a 
real law reflects the intuition that, as we might now put it, a p-value of 0.21 could fall into the acceptance region for 
a researcher who placed a high value on detecting faint signals.  (Edgeworth (1885, p. 201) provides another 
example of an economically small difference that, because it is statistically significant, should not be neglected 
scientifically.) 
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value.  The critical value is typically, but not always, chosen to secure a 5-percent probability of 
type I error under the null hypothesis (i.e., a 5-percent size of the test):  if the null hypothesis 
were true what is the probability that we would find an absolute value larger than the critical 
value?  A small size (high critical value) reduces the probability that we will identify sampled 
populations as possessing truly different moments. 
  Of course, there is another question:  what is the probability that we would wrongly 
identify the moments as equal when they are truly different?  What is the probability of type II 
error?  (Equivalently, what is the power of the test?)  The question is not specific enough to 
admit of an answer.  There is a tradeoff between size and power.  In the extreme, we can avoid 
type I error by accepting all null hypotheses, and we can avoid type II error by rejecting all null 
hypotheses (cf. William H. Kruskal 1968a, p. 245).  The choice of an intermediate size, such as 5 
percent, is frequently conventional and pragmatic (as with Edgeworth’s two to three times the 
modulus rule), but aims to make sure that type I error is tightly limited at the cost of having 
power only against alternatives that are sufficiently far from the null.
3  The power of a test can 
be computed only for specific alternative hypotheses.  Still, absent a well formulated alternative, 
we know that, for any given size, type II error will explode (power approach zero) if the true 
difference in moments is small enough.   
  The second type of test asks not whether sample moments are the same, but whether an 
estimated parameter is consistent with a population in which that parameter takes a definite value 
or range.  Student’s t-test is, perhaps, the most familiar example of the type.  If   is an estimated 
regression coefficient, 
β ˆ







=  has a known distribution under the null hypothesis, conditional on the underlying 
normality of the errors.  Thus, the probability of finding |t| greater than a particular critical value 
                                                 
3 Ronald Aylmer Fisher, who is an object of McCloskey’s (1998, p. 112; see also Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, pp. 
530-531, 542-544) special scorn, clearly understands the conventional nature of the customary 5-percent size:  “it is 
convenient to take [a size of 5 percent or critical value of 1.96] as a limit in judging whether a deviation is to be 
considered significant or not.  Deviations exceeding twice the standard deviation are thus formally regarded as 
significant” (Fisher 1946, p. 44).  Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p. 531) imply that Fisher has contradicted himself 
or, at least, shifted ground in moving from convenient in one sentence to formally regarded in the next.  We view 
Fisher as declaring a pragmatic convention, using formally in the sense of  “‘[A]s a rule’; under normal 
circumstances” (Oxford English Dictionary, definition 4.b).  Our view is reinforced by the fact that Fisher discusses 
the implications of a number of different test sizes than 5 percent in the same passage. 
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is given by the size of the test corresponding to that critical value (e.g., 5 percent corresponds to 
1.96).  The second type of test is, therefore, a special case of the first type. 
  It is perhaps not emphasized frequently enough that reasoning from significance tests 
proceeds from a statistical model, not directly from the raw data.  As Edgeworth (1885, pp. 186-
187, 208) already understood data may have to be transformed to account for the underlying 
processes that generate them before they will conform to a distribution supporting statistical 
tests.  Reasoning from (raw or transformed) data is only as good as the conformity of the data to 
the supposed probability distribution.  Specification tests (e.g., tests of homoscedasticity, serial 
correlation, or normality), which are significance tests of the first type, provide evidence that 
supports the conjecture that the statistical model is a good one.  We take up McCloskey’s failure 
to address this vital use of significance tests in section 2.5. 
  In a Neyman-Pearson framework in which the investigator is able to consider a well-
defined alternative hypothesis explicitly, acceptance and rejection of a null hypothesis are 
symmetrical concerns, and the choice is how to strike a balance between type I and type II error.  
When alternative hypotheses are not explicit, acceptance and rejection are asymmetrical.  A 
value greater than the critical value rejects a hypothesis, but a value less than the critical value 
does not imply acceptance, but failure to reject it.  The point is not a misplaced fastidiousness 
about language or mere “wordplay” (Kruskal 1968a, p. 245), even in those cases in which a 
failure to reject leads to ignoring the hypothesized effect.  Rather significance tests are a tool for 
the assessment of signal strength.  Rejection indicates a clear signal.  Failure to reject offers no 
evidence for choosing between two possibilities:  there is no signal to detect or noise 
overwhelms the signal.   
  Fisher (1946, p. 44) acknowledges this asymmetry when he states that, given a 5-percent 
(or other conventional) size, “[s]mall effects will still escape notice if the data are insufficiently 
numerous to bring them out . . .”  In pointing out the asymmetry of the significance test, we are 
not asserting that statistical significance is either necessary or sufficient for economic 
significance.  A noisily measured effect may be economically important; a well measured effect 
may be economically trivial. 
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2.2 DOES SIZE MATTER INDEPENDENTLY OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE? 
In one sense, the answer to this question is obvious:  size (here the magnitude of influence or 
what McCloskey (1992, p. 360) refers to as “oomph”) clearly matters (cf. Ziliak and McCloskey 
2004a, p. 527).  But who ever said otherwise?  A well-measured but trivial economic effect may 
be neglected.  But how should we regard an effect that is economically large but poorly 
measured in the sense that it is statistically insignificant?  McCloskey (2002, p. 50) answers this 
way: 
The effect is empirically there, whatever the noise is.  If someone called ‘Help, help!’ in a 
faint voice, in the midst of lots of noise, so that at the 1% level of significance (the 
satisfactorily low probability that you will be embarrassed by a false alarm) it could be that 
she’s saying “Kelp, kelp!” (which arose perhaps because she was in a heated argument 
about a word proposed in the game of Scrabble), you would not go to her rescue? 
[McCloskey 2002, p. 50; cf. 1998, p. 117]  
 
  The principal claim – “the effect is empirically there, whatever the noise is” – is 
extraordinary.  Noise masks the signal.  It may be there or it may not be there.  The point is that 
we do not know.   
  Clearly, if the costs and benefits are sufficiently skewed, we may seek more data in order 
to reduce the noise.  If the apparent faint cries for help come from a rubble heap after an 
earthquake (a situation in which we expect there to be victims), we literally dig further to get 
more data.  Our immediate conclusion is not that there is someone alive down there, but that 
there could be.  Yet, if the signal does not improve, we may reasonably give up looking; for, 
after all, the cost of looking in one pile, may mean that we are not finding victims in another.  
The point is that whether we respond to a signal depends on an interaction between the value of 
what is signaled (here a life) and the background noise.  If the potential cost of type II error is 
large, we may choose a large test size (here we dig in response to a faint signal).   
  Notice, however, it is the potential size of the payoff that matters (i.e., the value of what 
is signaled), not the size of the effect as estimated from the faint signal (i.e., the value of the 
signal).  The point is clearer in a different sort of example:  in a clinical trial a single subject with 
a migraine headache is given a licorice jelly bean, and the migraine quickly subsides.  Should we 
conclude that licorice jelly beans are effective against migraines?  Clearly not; the noise 
overwhelms the signal.  Yet, the principle is no different if we have five subjects, three of whom 
experience subsidence of migraine symptoms after eating a licorice jelly bean.  A rate of 60 
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percent is large, but we can have no confidence that it will stay large as more observations 
accrue.  A sixth observation, for example, will either raise the estimate to 67 percent or reduce it 
to 50 percent.  Which way it goes depends, in part, on whether the true systematic effect lies 
above or below the 60 percent estimate and, in part, on the size and variability of other 
influences – the noise.  The key point, well known to statisticians and econometricians, is that 
the presence of the noise implies that the measurement is not reliable when there are five or six 
or some other small number of observations.  The systematic effect is so badly measured that we 
can have no confidence that it is not truly some other quite distant number, including zero.  The 
function of the significance test is to convey the quality of the measurement, to give us an idea of 
the strength of the signal.  The principle involved when N = 1 or 5 is no different than when N = 
10,000. 
  One might well doubt that McCloskey would advocate using so silly an example as the 
licorice jelly beans, but in fact she does: 
It is not the case that statistically insignificant coefficients are in effect zero.  The 
experiments on aspirin and heart disease were halted short of statistical significance (at the 
level the medical researchers wanted to have) because the effect was so large in life-saving 
terms that it was immoral to go on with the double-blind experiment in which some people  
did not get their daily dose of aspirin.    [McCloskey 1998, p. 118] 
 
McCloskey cites the aspirin-heart attack story frequently (e.g., McCloskey 1995, p. 33 and 2002, 
p. 52; 2005, p. 22).  If it were true, it would illustrate the reasoning that she means to endorse.  
But, alas, the story is false:  the study was halted early because the effects of aspirin were both 
large and statistically significant.
4  To have halted it early simply because the results were large, 
though badly measured, would be to make the licorice-jelly-bean mistake. 
                                                 
4 According to the study in question, “the external Data Monitoring Board of the Physician’s Health Study took the 
unusual step of recommending the early termination of the randomized aspirin component of the trial, primarily 
because of a statistically extreme beneficial effect on nonfatal and fatal myocardial infarction had been found” 
(emphasis added).  The “difference between total myocardial infarction between aspirin and the placebo group has a 
P < 0.00001” (Charles H. Hennekens 1988, p. 262).  McCloskey based her interpretation on secondary sources 
rather than the original study (e-mail McCloskey to Kevin D. Hoover 31 July 2003).  McCloskey was apparently 
misled by the statements in a letter to the editor of the New England Journal of Medicine stating that “researchers 
found the results so positive that they ethically did not feel they should withhold aspirin’s benefits from the control 
placebo group” and, in a news report (FDA Consumer January-February 1994), that “[t]here was, however, no 
significant difference between the aspirin and placebo groups in number of strokes . . . or in overall deaths from 
cardiovascular disease” (both cited in the previously cited e-mail).  But “positive” need not mean, as McCloskey 
takes it, large and statistically insignificant nor are heart attacks the same thing as strokes or overall deaths from 
cardiovascular disease.   
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  The message matters, but the message must rise above the noise before we can know 
what it is.  The Second Coming of Christ would surely be a defining event in human history, but 
the most devout Christian (perhaps especially the most devout Christian) should hesitate from 
declaring a vision of Jesus when it could equally well be the play of light on a snowdrift.   
  McCloskey writes as if statistical significance or insignificance were a mere artifact of 
sample size (McCloskey 1998, pp. 117-119; 123-124; McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, pp. 98-99, 
101; Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, p. 535).  As Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, pp. 540-541) put 
it, “all hypotheses are rejected, and in mathematical fact, without having to look at the data, you 
know that they will be rejected at any pre-assigned level of significance.”
5   
  McCloskey frequently writes as if the fact that estimated standard error falls as sample 
size rises implies that an estimate on a small data set will necessarily yield essentially the same 
mean value as one on a large data set, though the former will be insignificant and the latter 
significant (McCloskey 2002, pp. 50-52; Ziliak and McCloskey 2004b, p. 674).  This is the basis 
for Ziliak and McCloskey’s (1996, p. 108) claim that policy ought to be guided by insignificant 
mean estimates – ignoring the noise and calculating costs and benefits as if the mean were 
known:  “You have to go with what God has provided” (McCloskey 2002, p. 53; cf. section 5.2 
below). 
  The argument is fallacious.  Yes, the estimated standard error falls as the sample size 
rises, but the noise does not necessarily shrink around the initial estimate of the mean (cf. Jeffrey 
M. Wooldridge 2004, pp. 578-579).  The point is clearly expressed by Rebecca Blank (1991, p. 
1053) in a paper on the effects of blind refereeing in the American Economic Review that showed 
that women’s acceptance rates were lower in blind samples, though statistically insignificant, 
than in non-blind samples: 
It is true that these differences would be significant with a larger sample of papers.  The 
lack of statistical significance, however, indicates that one cannot assume that a larger 
sample of papers would produce the same result.  
 
Surely, Blank’s study addresses an important question for the economics profession.  The 
message of the significance tests is not that women are treated fairly in the refereeing process, 
but that we do not have clear evidence that they are not. 
                                                 
5 McCloskey (1985, p. 202) was more moderate and more correct when she noted that this claim does not hold when 
the true hypothesis is “literally zero” – see also section 2.5 below. 
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  To make the point clear, consider a world in which investment is generated according to 
the following equation: 
 
(1)   investment = constant + α × interest rate + β × tax rate + error. 
 
If tax rates and β are big, then tax rates are economically important.  Now do an experiment.  
Suppose that for the entire sample period, the tax rate is constant.  This assumption in no way 
undercuts the economic importance of tax rates.  Generate some artificial data for interest rates, 
and a constant tax rate, and choose some parameters for the equation.  Try to estimate equation 
(1) as a regression.  Of course, the package will stall:  the tax rate and the constant are perfectly 
collinear and the product matrix of the independent variables is singular.  This is equivalent to an 
infinitely large standard error on β.  In this case, no measurement is possible unless we eliminate 
the tax rate from the regression. 
  Now alter the experiment.  Add some noise to the tax rate variable, so that it is a constant 
plus just enough random variation to allow the econometric package successfully to invert the 
product matrix.  The standard error on β will be huge (the t-statistic near zero), and the 
coefficient estimate could essentially fall anywhere from negative to positive infinity.  A few 
tries with new random noise will almost certainly produce an estimate of β that diverges widely 
from the true β.  For example, β might equal 1 (and that might well be economically important), 
and the estimated  equal 2,000.    β ˆ
  Obviously, we should not regard this estimate as the true one nor use it for policy 
analysis.  The message of the standard error is that the signal is swamped by the noise, so that we 
cannot detect the true value.  Were the number of observations or the variability of taxes much 
larger, then we might get a decent estimate.  But, in general, it will be one that converges on the 
true value, not – as McCloskey’s practice implies – one that approximates the initial estimate 
with any degree of reliability. 
  McCloskey’s unsupportable idea, that an estimate can be reliably used independently of 
the accompanying noise, leads to a perverse conclusion.  As written, question 1 (see Table 1) 
proposes that few observations are to be preferred to many.  Of course, that is nonsense; more 
information is better than less.  What is true, as McCloskey and Ziliak (1996, p. 102) hint, is that 
the power of tests rises with the number of observations, so that there may be a more favorable 
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tradeoff between type I and type II error in large samples that can be captured by using a test 
with a smaller size.  Failing to reduce the test size with an increasing number of observations 




2.3 THE NEYMAN-PEARSON FRAMEWORK 
The only situations in which McCloskey appears to accept the usefulness of statistical 
significance is when it is cast into a strict, decision-theoretic Neyman-Pearson framework, the 
marker of which is the existence of an explicit loss function:  “You can’t run science without a 
loss function” (McCloskey 1998, p. 118; cf. 1985b; 1992, p. 359; 1999, p. 361; 2002, p. 58; 
Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, p. 543).  Questions 8 and 9 (Table 1) concerning statistical power 
indirectly address the issue of loss functions.   
  McCloskey confuses science and engineering.  Broadly speaking, the goal of science is to 
understand the way the world works; the goal of engineering is to achieve particular outcomes.  
Science and engineering frequently stand in a relationship of mutual aid.  Still, they are 
conceptually distinct.  The Neyman-Pearson framework is most at home in applications such as 
production control in which it is possible to formulate a tractable probability model in which a 
null hypothesis with a crisp alternative can be related through a clearly defined loss function.  
Such engineering problems may provide illuminating metaphors for science, but science cannot 
broadly advance by applying such a framework. 
  Because tractability is central, the Neyman-Pearson framework can be applied only to 
“small worlds” (to use Leonard Savage’s 1954 [1972], pp. 82-91, evocative term).
7  The way of 
truth is one; the ways of error many.  In some tightly defined engineering problems (some of 
which may be embedded in a scientific investigation), the detailed Neyman-Pearson approach 
may have considerable purchase.  But how could it be applied to a larger scientific inquiry, in 
which it would be impossible to articulate, much less to incorporate into a loss function, every 
alternative to the null hypothesis?  And whose loss function should we choose? 
                                                 
6 Information criteria, such as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) can be used to avoid such idiosyncratic 
preferences, since in an situation in which tests are nested, the BIC essentially acts to lower the significance level as 
sample size increases. 
7 Savage used this term to explain the limits on his own preferred sort of personalist Bayesian statistics, which he 
regarded as “a natural late development of the Neyman-Pearson ideas” (see Keuzenkamp 2000, pp. 84-86 for the 
citation and discussion). 
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  Consider that landmark in the history of physics, Isaac Newton’s mechanics.  Newton, of 
course, did not appeal to statistics in his Principia.
8  Types I and II error are not unique to 
statistical inference, however, and the case for or against an optimal balance between them based 
on a loss function applies in a wider domain.
9  In formulating his mechanics, none of Newton’s 
choices were governed by a balancing of type I and type II error.  Around which of the 
uncountable (and to him often unforeseeable) practical applications of his mechanics should 
Newton have structured his loss function?  An engineer designing a bridge may have a loss 
function; he may find Newtonian mechanics useful in articulating that loss function; but the truth 
of Newton’s mechanics in no way depends on the benefits of the traffic flowing over the bridge 
nor yet on the costs of its falling down.   
  If the science of physics need not depend on its practical import, why must the science of 
economics?  McCloskey may wish to maintain that economics, by its nature, should be more 
worldly than physics.  Perhaps.  But that is quite different than asserting that, to be a science, it 
must be connected to worldly concerns through a loss function.
10   
  McCloskey is engaged in a sleight of hand, equivocating on the words “science” and 
“economics” and their derivatives.  The Oxford English Dictionary gives two pertinent 
definitions of “economic”:  definition 2.a: “[r]elating to the science of economics; relating to the 
development and regulation of the material resources of a community or nation”; and 2.c:   
“[p]ractical or utilitarian in application or use.”  To argue that “economic significance” is a 
parallel notion to “scientific significance,” McCloskey implicitly appeals to the first definition, 
while to sustain the centrality of the loss function to economics and science, she must appeal 
implicitly to the second.   
  An example clarifies the illusion.  In discussing an article by Gary Solon (1992) in which 
the correlation between the incomes of fathers and sons is at issue, Ziliak and McCloskey 
                                                 
8 Newton did use statistical ideas in assessing historical evidence, but seems to have foregone applying them to a 
problem of practical personal gain in assessing the quality of the coinage while Master of the Mint (Stigler 1999, pp. 
394-397). 
9 Graham Elliott and Clive W.J. Granger (2004, p. 549) make the point that the degree of bending of starlight in 
Arthur Eddington’s famous observations of the eclipse in 1919 was too small to matter practically, yet nevertheless 
served to distinguish Einstein’s from Newton’s mechanics.  Ziliak and McCloskey’s (2004b, pp. 668-669) riposte 
that Eddington did not use statistics misses the point:  Elliott and Granger never said that he did, nor need they even 
have believed it implicitly, since the argument about loss functions is more general than statistics.  Kruskal (1968b, 
p. 218) points out that many objections to statistical inference apply “equally to any mode of analysis – formal, 
informal, or intuitive.” 
10 McCloskey (2002, pp. 37-38) certainly claims that economics is more worldly than mathematics, which she 
regards not as a science, but as “a kind of abstract art,” though not to be disdained for that. 
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(2004a, p. 539) assert that “a tightly fit correlation of 0.20000000001***, would say nothing of 
economic significance.”  We take the example to presuppose that “tightly fit” implies that the last 
digit is statistically significant.  We readily grant that nothing of practical importance could hang 
on whether the true value were the one estimated or exactly 0.2.  Yet, if an economist could in 
fact discriminate an economic magnitude in the tenth decimal place (a degree of accuracy that is 
sometimes found in physics) it would be quite remarkable and of great scientific interest to 
economists – not for its practical import but for the degree of refinement that it would imply 
about our empirical tools.
11  In general, as Edgeworth observed (see footnote 2), the purpose of 
science need not be practical.  Some scientists have a practical turn of mind, and would never 
work on a problem that did not have foreseeable practical consequences – though even in that 
case, it is not obvious that a loss function can generally  be successfully articulated.  Yet, 
economics, like other sciences, distinguishes between what is true about the world and the 
practical import of a truth. 
  We do not deny that practical considerations of probable gain and cost play a part in the 
design and management of research.  The notion of the Economy of Research was initiated by 
the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce (1885), who was also an important contributor to 
statistics and its applications to psychology and other fields.
12  Loss functions useful in the 
economic analysis of research may be difficult to formulate.  But, even when they can be 
formulated, the relevant measures of costs and, especially, benefits are generally defined in terms 
of their import to the enterprise of pure science and not in terms of their practical import for the 
wider world.  Indeed, the scientific enterprise itself need not have any practical ambitions.  For 
example, Newton believed that gravity followed an exact inverse-square law.  If, in fact, the 
relevant power were shown to differ from 2 in the twenty-ninth decimal place, there might be no 
practical implications:  rockets would still fly to the moon, despite using the old formula (see 
section 3 below).  Yet, the result would be highly important, as the exactness of the inverse-
square law was an essential element in the theory. 
                                                 
11 Feynman (1985, p. 7) cites, as one of many examples, measurements of Dirac’s number, which are accurate to the 
11
th decimal place (more precisely, 4 × 10
–9 percent), the equivalent of measuring the distance between New York 
and Los Angeles to the width of a human hair.  Feynman cites the accuracy of this result, about five times more 
accurate than the predictions of the relevant theory, not for any gain or loss that it implies, but for the beauty of the 
conformity of theory and observation.   
12 On the economy of research, see James R. Wible 1994, 1998; on Peirce as a statistician, see Stigler 1999, ch. 10. 
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  Practical implications matter, but they are not the only concerns of science qua science.  
Rather than seeing science concerned with how things are, McCloskey sees it as primarily a 
guide to practical decisions.  But that makes a nonsense of the history of all science – not only of 
economics – as well as current practice.   
  We also do not deny the usefulness of the Neyman-Pearson approach as a tool of 
scientific investigation where the alternatives are clearly articulable, the probability models 
tractable, and the loss functions relevant to the scientific problem.  (But as Kruskal 1968a, p. 
240, points out, most significance testing cannot be cast into a crisp decision-theoretic mode; cf. 
Gerd Gigerenzer 2004, p. 591).  The philosopher Deborah Mayo (1996), for instance, defends 
the Neyman-Pearson approach, particularly against Bayesianism taken as an all encompassing 
philosophy of science.  She finds the Neyman-Pearson approach important in a program of strict 
local testing aimed at minimizing error – that is, at efficiently extracting signal from noise.  
Statistical testing, in this view, is not about directly confirming or disconfirming a high-level 
theory, but about obtaining reliable observations.  Unlike McCloskey, however, she does not 
condemn Fisher for not adopting the Neyman-Pearson approach.  Like Edgeworth before him, 
Fisher rightly saw the statistical problem as signal extraction.  A reliable observation is not 
generally the final step in scientific reasoning, but a piece of evidence that will be assessed in a 
wider context.  Microscopes and telescopes provide reliable observations only when in focus.  
Similarly, significance tests are among the focusing criteria for statistical data (cf. Hoover 1994).   
  Advocates of the Neyman-Pearson approach frequently favor reporting confidence 
intervals.  And McCloskey too is an advocate, but complains that “. . . economists seldom report 
confidence intervals” (Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, p. 534).  The claim is false.  The standard 
practice of the large number of empirical macroeconomists who report impulse-response 
functions is to graph the confidence intervals.  Similarly, investigations using autocorrelation or 
partial autocorrelation functions typically report confidence bands; while those using survival or 
duration data routinely report confidence bands around estimated survivor functions, hazard 
functions, and cumulative hazard functions.  More broadly, a search of economics journals 
archived in JSTOR over 1980-1999, a period that covers both of McCloskey and Ziliak’s 
surveys, finds 131 entries in articles in the American Economic Review for phrases indicative of 
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reporting or using confidence intervals.
13  A search of all thirty-nine economics journals 
archived in JSTOR over the same period finds 1,788 entries. 
  Whatever the truth of McCloskey’s view on how frequently economists report them, her 
favorable regard for confidence intervals is puzzling in light of her disdain for significance tests.  
The conventional significance test for normal errors rejects when the estimate is more than two 
standard errors away from the null.  The confidence interval is constructed, in this case, as ± two 
standard errors from the estimate.  To say that zero or some other hypothesized value lies outside 
the confidence interval is isomorphic to computing the significance test taking the hypothesized 
value as the null.  Even those researchers who do not report confidence intervals frequently use 
confidence-interval reasoning and, in most cases, report sufficient information for a reader to 
compute the confidence intervals themselves (coefficient estimates plus standard errors, t-tests – 
or even p-values – are enough to construct confidence intervals).  The complaint, then, is one of 
taste rather than principle (see Elliott and Granger 2004, p. 548).  And it is inconsistent:  if 
significance tests are scientifically suspect, so must confidence intervals also be. 
 
2.4 THE PROBABILITY APPROACH TO ECONOMETRICS 
In many situations, McCloskey believes that significance tests, even in a proper Neyman-Pearson 
framework, have no place, because economists possess the entire population: 
For one thing, as we have said, the errors that tests of significance deal with are errors of 
sampling, but in many cases there is no sample involved:  we have the entire universe of 
observations of the general price level in the United States and the United Kingdom 1880-
1940. [McCloskey 1984, p. 134; cf. McCloskey 1985b, p. 204]  
 
  McCloskey misses a vital point.  If we calculate the mean weight of Mrs. Clary’s sixth-
grade, we may regard the class as the entire population, and the mean as a descriptive statistic.  
But if we use the mean of Mrs. Clary’s class as an indication of the likely mean of Mrs. Coyle’s 
sixth-grade class, then we are regarding Ms. Clary’s class as a sample of a wider population 
(e.g., of the sixth-grade class in Graham Road Elementary School).  Any time we project a 
statistic out of sample or consider its projectability to be the vital question, we regard the 
observed data as a sample.  Of course, questions of the representativeness of the sample, of the 
                                                 
13 The search terms were:  “confidence interval(s),” “error band(s),” “2 (two) standard error(s),” “2 (two) standard 
deviation(s).”  The numbers for the American Economic Review are not strictly comparable to McCloskey and 
Ziliak’s surveys which exclude articles from the Papers and Proceedings (May) numbers and shorter articles. 
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homogeneity of the population, and so forth arise immediately, but they are not the essence of 
McCloskey’s point. 
  Consider a real-world example familiar to many universities:  a study that compares 
salaries of female and male faculty.  The key question in such a study is not the raw fact of the 
difference in means between men and women.  Instead, the objects should be, first, to determine 
whether there are differences that, controlling for other factors not indicative of discrimination, 
can be attributed to sex and, second, to shed light on the mechanisms behind any discriminatory 
difference (e.g., does it occur because one sex is hired at lower rates of pay or because promotion 
is slower?).   
  If we construct a dataset that covers the entire faculty of the University of California at 
Davis we do not have – as McCloskey insists – the whole population, since the questions that we 
want to answer most involve a population wider than the current faculty in a variety of senses.  
To take one example:  if the current mechanisms remain in place, would the next cohort of 
women hired be paid the same as men with similar relevant characteristics?  Here the mechanism 
is regarded as open-ended, and we simply wait for more realizations.  A second example:  are the 
differences between the pay of men and women the result of differences in relevant 
characteristics or sex discrimination?  Here the population is a hypothetical one:  we use the 
actual faculty cohort (a sample) to infer what outcomes would be for a cohort that differed from 
the actual one only in the sex assignment of its members (unrealized, as well as unobserved, 
members of the population). 
  Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p. 543) dismiss appeals to hypothetical populations as 
“metaphysical” – with the implication that the term is synonymous with “nonsense” (also 
McCloskey 1985a, pp. 161-162).
14  But the scientific question is not generally, “what 
happened?” but “what lies behind whatever happened?”  The policy question is generally, “what 
will happen if . . .?”  Answers to either sort of question contemplate mechanisms that are capable 
of realizing outcomes other than, and additional to, those already observed.  The observed are, 
then, part of a sample, and the measures of the precision of estimates of key features of the 
underlying mechanism – expressed, for example, in standard errors, confidence intervals, and 
significance tests – are of great utility. 
                                                 
14 She is inconsistent.  In other moods, McCloskey (2002, pp. 30, 32) berates economists for dismissing 
metaphysics. 
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  McCloskey seems to imagine that such measures of precision are at home only in the 
narrow case of situations similar to production control.  If one wants to produce ball bearings 
within a certain tolerance but does not wish to test each one, test a sample (with a Neyman-
Pearson loss function guiding acceptance or rejection), and project the outcome to the whole 
population.  But science is not an assembly line.  Many experiments are run and all the results 
are recorded.  By McCloskey’s reasoning, the data from such experiments do not supply 
samples, but are in fact the whole population.  But, of course, the point of the experiment is to 
discover what would happen were the experiment to be run again and to develop evidence 
bearing on the mechanisms that lie behind the experimental realizations.   
  Economic data are rarely experimental.  McCloskey (1985b, p. 204; 1998, pp. 138) 
particularly sees time series data as never meeting the conditions of being a sample of a 
population:  history has only one run.  Yet, experiments are similar in this respect.  An 
experiment can never be repeated exactly.  When we say that are repeating the “same” 
experiment, we are making a judgment that we have repeated the relevant aspects of the set up.  
We ignore many others:  the chemist does “not note that this phenomenon was produced on such 
a day of the week, the planets presenting a certain configuration, his daughter having on a blue 
dress, he having dreamed of a white horse the night before, the milkman having been late that 
morning, and so on” (cf. Peirce 1934, vol. 5, para. 591).  It is not that these could not under any 
conceivable circumstances be relevant; rather, we make fallible judgments that they are not in 
these circumstances in fact relevant. 
  Trygve Haavelmo’s (1944) great contribution to econometrics was to show that non-
experimental data, which did not automatically conform to a statistical model such as 
contemplated by Fisher, could nevertheless be modeled as an economic structure plus errors, 
where the errors conform to a probability model (see Mary S. Morgan 1990, p. ch. 8, and Aris 
Spanos 1995).  A time series, which is typically a single run of data, in this conception is, in part, 
built up of realizations of a probability distribution, so that the variables are a sample of 
population that will 1) provide further realizations if allowed to run; and 2) could have provided 
different paths had the errors been realized differently.  There is only one actual path of a time 
series, but there could have been others, and it makes sense to ask how far a path that was not 
realized could depart from the one that was actually realized without there being any change in 
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the underlying structure.  Making such assessments is, of course, one of the uses of standard 
errors, confidence intervals, and significance tests. 
  Time series and experimental data are different; yet, with respect to whether we do or do 
not have the whole population, it is not a difference in kind.  There is a special uncertainty, 
which is not captured in sampling error, about homogeneity.  In the case of time series, radically 
different behavior may result because the deep structure generating the data changes (a structural 
break).  Such a concern is particularly pertinent for time series, but again it has analogues in 
other kinds of cases.  Significance tests of the first type (“are the moments of this sample 
distinguishable from the moments of that sample?”) are useful in detecting such departures from 
homogeneity, since they address the question of whether the signal rises above the noise.   
Would, say, the difference of the means be larger than what would normally follow from random 
variation in a homogeneous structure? 
  It is true that we have all the observations of the general price level in the United States 
and the United Kingdom 1880-1940 that were actually realized.  But with respect to the question 
of purchasing-power parity, in which context McCloskey originally made her claim, so what?  
As scientists, we are interested in whether the economic mechanism displays purchasing-power 
parity.  The 1880-1940 period can be seen as a sample of a population that extends into earlier 
and later times.  And, just as Mrs. Clary’s sixth-grade class can be seen as a sample of the sixth-
grade classes in Virginia in 1967, as well as a sample of the sixth-grade classes at Graham Road 
School, the time series of prices can be seen as a sample of a population that extends across other 
countries as well as other times and over realizations that never occurred.   
  We do not wish to minimize the problems of ensuring that such populations conform to 
an adequate probability model and are, therefore, sufficiently homogeneous to sustain useful 
inference.  We are not claiming that any arbitrary set of data can usefully be regarded as a 
sample of a larger population.  For such an interpretation to be valid, the data must either 
conform, or be such that they can be transformed to conform, to a tractable probability model.  
The point of specification tests is to establish that data in particular cases do conform usefully to 
a probability model.  Such specification tests provide another example of the useful application 
of the tools of significance tests, which McCloskey ignores in focusing on the significance 
testing of the coefficients of regression equations. 
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  It is puzzling that McCloskey, an advocate of the cliometric approach to economic 
history, should fail to grasp the point that we must situate observed data in the context of 
population data that could have been, but was not in fact, observed.  The great achievement of 
the cliometric school is to understand that historical data need not be viewed as “one damned 
thing after another” but can instead be viewed as the outcome of an enduring economic 
mechanism that conforms reasonably to economic theory.  The counterfactual or hypothetical 
nature of such scientific knowledge is acknowledged for example in Robert W. Fogel’s (1964) 
famous counterfactual analysis of the development of American railroads and the literature it 
spawned.  Fogel essentially compares one run of the American economy as it was actually 
realized to one run in which there were no railroads.  Such a comparison relies on the idea that 
what was actually observed was but one possibility – a sample from a hypothetical population  
(cf. James Woodward 2003). 
  Hoover (2001, ch. 4) argues that all causal explanation of particular events (the crash of 
an airplane or a stock market) relies on subsuming the contributory elements to particular generic 
causal mechanisms.  If these elements cannot be viewed in such a way that (in stochastic cases) 
the observations form a sample of a larger, but unrealized, population, then no causal and, 
therefore, no historical explanation is possible. 
  It is equally puzzling that McCloskey, who strongly advocates simulations as an 
alternative to significance testing, should fail to see that simulations necessarily – and usefully – 
trade in hypotheticals:  what could have been, but was not; what could be, but is not yet (Table 1, 
question 17; McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, pp. 104, 112).  The meaningfulness of any such 
simulation rests on exactly the same grounds as the meaningfulness of treating realized data as 
one possible draw from an unobserved population. 
 
2.5 SPECIFICATION SEARCH 
McCloskey condemns the practice of using significance tests to eliminate variables from 
regression equations and the related practice of specification search (Table 1, question 14; 
McCloskey 1992, p. 361; McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, pp. 104, 106; Ziliak and McCloskey 
2004a, p. 534).  In emphasizing the size of the estimated conditional means of regression 
equations (the “oomph”), she avoids one of the most central issues in statistics and a vital use of 
significance tests.  The approach is question-begging, assuming the very thing that needs to be 
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demonstrated:  “the accuracy of [the] estimated mean [of a regression coefficient] depends on the 
properties of the error term, the specification of the model, and so forth.  But to fix ideas suppose 
that all the usual econometric problems have been solved” (McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, p. 98, 
emphasis added).  But how would we justify such a supposition? 
  As we stressed in the last section, statistical measurements of economic magnitudes are 
meaningful only in the context of a statistical model that adequately characterizes the data.  To 
establish the congruence of the model to the data requires testing (see Spanos 1995 and Søren 
Johansen 2005).  Significance tests are used to provide evidence relevant to the existence of 
serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, departures from normality, structural breaks, and other 
departures from the statistical model that justifies the assumption that a particular coefficient 
estimate is a good one.  Such tests are typically applied in the asymmetrical manner of Fisher 
(reject/unable-to-reject instead of reject/accept) rather than in the context of a particular loss 
function.  But, even if such a loss function were available, the connection between the critical 
value in, say, a test of serial correlation and the ultimate practical economic gains or losses from 
an error in assessing a regression coefficient are so complex and indirect that they would defy 
calculation.  The power of such tests is not typically ignored; it is a major consideration among 
professional econometricians, even if it is less frequently discussed by applied economists. 
  Aside from some desultory condemnations of the use of such specification tests (e.g., 
McCloskey 1999, p. 361 on unit roots tests), McCloskey has little systematic to say about error 
specification, taking it to be unproblematic.  In contrast, she clearly attacks the elimination of 
variables from regression specifications on the grounds of their statistical insignificance.   
  Variable elimination is less common in economics – especially among microeconomists 
using large data sets – than it is, for example, in epidemiology or other areas of medical research 
that faithfully apply a standard of p < 0.05 for reporting estimates.  For example, in cross-
sectional wage, or earnings, regressions, it is standard use a “kitchen sink” regression that 
includes age, race, education, region, and so forth (the “usual suspects”) and, frequently, their 
interactions as well and to retain them in reported regressions whether or not they are statistically 
significant. 
  McCloskey appears to have three (closely related) objections.  The first is that a statistical 
criterion may result in the elimination of economically significant variables.  The second is 
closely related:  a large sample size generally produces statistically significant estimates even 
  21Hoover and Siegler, “McCloskey and Significance Testing in Economics” 
Revised, 27 November 2005 
when they are not significant economically, which suggests that a statistical criterion is 
irrelevant.  Finally, elimination of coefficients smacks of data mining, which is widely regarded 
as an unacceptable practice. 
  As we saw in section 1, typical significance tests relate the magnitude of a measured 
coefficient to the sample variability.  But sample variability is itself a fortuitous product of the 
sample size.  The economic meaning of a coefficient estimate should not then, in McCloskey’s 
view, depend on its statistical significance.  But again, statistical significance conveys important 
information about the accuracy of the measurement, even though it does not determine the 
economic significance of an estimated coefficient.  As the example of the investment equation in 
section 2.2 above makes clear, eliminating a variable from a regression may be a reasonable 
thing, despite its economic significance.  The role of the standard error and the significance test 
is to tell us where we find ourselves along the continuum from the impossibility of measurement 
in the case of an absolutely constant variable to the perfect accuracy of an infinite sample. 
 Elimination  of  variables that are badly measured is not a statement about their ontological 
status – in the investment equation, taxes are economically important ex hypothesi.  Rather, it is a 
measurement strategy.  McCloskey’s general claim that any coefficient is significant if the 
sample size is large enough is false (see section 2.2 above).  As Kruskal (1968a, p. 246) reminds 
us, some nulls may be exactly zero.  And if a coefficient is exactly zero, then a larger and larger 
sample simply shrinks the standard error around that value.   
  There are two cases in which a regression coefficient should naturally return a value of 
exactly zero (Hoover 2001, ch. 2, sec. 2.4).  First, a coefficient may have a range of possible 
values that includes zero.  Policy variables, for instance, may include zero as a focal point when 
the policymakers intend to use their instruments to eliminate the influence of a particular factor.  
For example, suppose that the money were causally linked to real GDP and the interest rate and 
that the Federal Reserve adjusted the money supply in such a way as to hit a target interest rate 
precisely.  If they are successful, a regression of the interest rate on money and income should 
find zero coefficients, except for sampling error (see Hoover 2001, pp. 47-49). 
  Second, an estimated coefficient may converge on zero because the variable in question 
is not causally connected to the dependent variable.  In the first case, a variable can be conceived 
of as a set of possible values (Ω) which takes a particular value ( Ω ∈ = 0 β ).  In the second case, 
the set of possible values is empty (Ω = ∅).   
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  If neither of these cases apply (the true β ≠ 0, Ω ≠ ∅), then for a sufficiently large 
number of observations, provided that the variable itself is not constant, the estimate of β will be 
statistically significant at whatever size one likes:  more data leads to more precise measurement.  
A very precisely measured but substantively small coefficient may not be practically significant.  
Being precisely measured, however, one can be confident in the judgment about practical 
significance.  A badly measured but large coefficient may or may not be practically significant:  
the message of the significance test is that one cannot be confident one way or the other; more 
data are needed. 
  A variable that happens to be set to zero remains economically significant – it could have 
been set to some other value.  A variable that is not causally connected to the dependent variable 
is economically insignificant.  Both should show up as indistinguishable from zero in a 
regression equation.  Non-statistical information is vital to distinguishing these two cases 
(Hoover 2001, ch. 8).  Evidence that a coefficient cannot be distinguished from zero, means 
either that one of these cases holds or that the magnitude of the coefficient is close enough to 
zero that the test lacks power.  We have no choice in such a case but to admit that our 
measurements are imprecise, to keep an open mind, and to seek more evidence.  But if the 
coefficient is statistically significant, then we can legitimately address its economic magnitude. 
  Variable elimination on the basis of significance tests is a form of data mining.   
McCloskey (1985a, p. 170; 1985b, p. 201; 1992, p. 361; 1997, p. 242) accepts the conventional 
condemnation of data mining without much further analysis.
15  One class of objections is that 
data mining generates size distortions that make statistically insignificant results appear to be 
statistically significant.  For instance, Michael Lovell (1983, pp. 2-4, cited by McCloskey 1985b, 
p. 201, and McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, p. 112) demonstrates that, when an independent variable 
is truly random and all potential regressors are orthogonal, the probability of finding significant 
                                                 
15 Data mining is discussed in detail in Hoover (1995) and Hoover and Stephen J. Perez (2000).  On the one hand, 
McCloskey condemns data mining; on the other hand, McCloskey (1985a, pp. 139-140; 1985b, p. 162) cites 
favorably Edward Leamer’s (1978) analysis of specification search and his (1983) “extreme-bounds analysis.”  Both 
involve data mining.  Oddly, Ziliak and McCloskey (score sheets for 2004a, personal communication) omit both 
Leamer’s (1983) article and Michael McAleer, Adrian Pagan, and Paul A. Volcker’s (1985) rebuttal, both of which 
appeared in the American Economic Review and meet the criteria for their survey of articles from the 1990s.  
Similarly, Thomas F. Cooley and Stephen F. LeRoy’s application of extreme-bounds analysis to money demand, 
which is itself favorably cited by McCloskey (1985a, p. 140), is omitted from the survey of the 1980s.  More oddly 
still, in light of the favorable evaluation of extreme-bounds analysis, Ross Levine and David Renelt’s (1992) article, 
which is a straightforward application of extreme-bounds to cross-country growth regressions, scores only 3 out of 
19 in the 1990s survey – the third worst performance on their survey in the 1990s. 
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regressors from a fixed set is higher than the nominal test size.  How much higher depends on 
how many regressors are considered.  Lovell’s conclusions are closely related to the 
characteristics of optional stopping rules, which have been carefully analyzed by statisticians 
(see Mayo 1996, chapter 10), and to much discussed, but less well analyzed, “file-drawer 
problem” – that is, to the publication only of significant results (see, for example, James Kahn, 
Steven Landsburg, and Alan Stockman 1996; Kruskal 1968a, p. 245; Ziliak and McCloskey 
2004a, p. 534).   
  It is common, but not warranted to generalize from these objections to a general 
condemnation of specification search.  Lovell (1983) shows that, with a fixed set of regressors 
and a fixed sample size, three search algorithms (stepwise regression, max 
2 R , and max-min |t|) 
return substantial size distortions.  However, these particular search algorithms pay no attention 
to the congruence of the data with the hypothesized statistical model of the error, which turns out 
to be crucial. 
  A theorem due to Halbert White (1990, pp. 379-380) states that, for a fixed set of 
specifications and a battery of specification tests, as the sample size grows toward infinity and 
increasingly smaller test sizes (or, equivalently, larger critical values) are employed, the test 
battery will, with a probability approaching unity, select the correct specification from the set.  
Both type I and type II error fall asymptotically to zero.  The theorem says that, given enough 
data, only the true specification will survive a stringent enough set of tests.  The theorem 
provides a deep justification for search methodologies, such as the “LSE approach” (Grayham 
Mizon 1995), that emphasize rigorous testing of the statistical properties of the error terms.  
McCloskey and Ziliak’s (2004a, p. 530) jabs at David F. Hendry’s (1980, pp. 27-28) mantra, 
“the golden rule of econometrics is test, test, test,” miss the mark:  Hendry and other LSE 
econometricians do not mistake statistical for economic significance, rather they insist that a 
coefficient can be well measured only in the context of a statistical model that meets stringent 
criteria that would support accurate measurement.  Specification testing provides evidence of the 
congruence between the supposed model and the data.   
  In Monte Carlo experiments, in which there is a true specification ex hypothesi, Hoover 
and Perez (1999, 2004), Hendry and Hans-Martin Krolzig (1999), and Krolzig and Hendry 
(2001) demonstrate that LSE search algorithms are very good at recovering it.  In contrast to the 
algorithms criticized by Lovell, the LSE algorithms display empirical size near the nominal size 
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of the underlying tests and empirical power near the best possible for given signal strengths.  
These results depend crucially on specification search (data mining).  As Hendry and Krolzig 
(2004) put it the costs of search (when the search is conducted sensibly) are small relative to the 
costs of inference from using an incorrectly specified model.   
  In supposing that “all the usual econometric problems have been solved,” McCloskey 
herself avoids the real work of econometrics.  Kruskal (1968b, p. 218) – one of McCloskey’s 
(1998, p. 116; Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, p. 530) most revered authorities – says, “it would be 
ridiculously rigid to refuse to use inferential tools [hypothesis tests] in the exploration of data.”  
In opposing significance tests for specification adequacy, McCloskey would deny economists the 
tools to do their work. 
 
3. Real Scientists Do Use Significance Tests 
Real scientists, McCloskey believes, have little use for significance tests.  She hopes that 
economics will “grow up and start focusing its energies on doing proper science (the way 
physics or geology or anthropology or certain parts of literary criticism do it) . . .” 
(McCloskey 2002, p. 1).  Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p. 533) state that they have found “by 
examining  The Physical Review that physicists approximately never use tests of statistical 
significance; so too in the magazine Science, the chemists and geologists; many biologists 
reporting their results in Science are less clear-minded on the matter . . .” (cf. McCloskey 1999, 
p. 357-358; 2002, pp. 46 and 54; Ziliak and McCloskey 2004b, p. 669). 
  McCloskey is wrong; significance tests are a standard tool in the physical sciences.  A 
skewed pattern of tool use reflects, not a difference between real science and cargo-cult science, 
but differences in the observational problems faced in different fields.  Each chooses tools 
appropriate to the problem to hand.   
  To gather some evidence on this point we performed a search of the JSTOR Archive of 
academic journals for the period 1980 through 1999 (the period of the two surveys of the 
American Economic Review reported in McCloskey and Ziliak 1996 and Ziliak and McCloskey 
2004a) using a set of keywords that would indicate the use of tests of statistical significance.
16  
The Physical Review is not archived by JSTOR, so we searched its online version on the website 
                                                 
16 The key words were “statistically significant,” “statistical significance,” “significance test,” “test of significance,” 
“significance tests,” “tests of significance,” “t-test,” “F-test,” and “chi squared.” 
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for the American Physical Society’s journals.  The search provides counts of the number of 
articles (not the number of instances of a use) in which any one of the keywords is found.  For 
instance, Table 2 shows that for a search of seven General Science journals (a category that 
includes the journal Science cited by Ziliak and McCloskey), 23 percent of articles used one of 
the keywords.   
  To get a sense of the relative differences in use of significance tests between fields, we 
performed searches of the seven General Science journals in which the words “astronomy,” 
“biology,” “chemistry,” “cosmology,” “geology,” “medicine,” and “physics” appear.  An 
inspection of the actual papers found in the chemistry search suggest that many of them are 
biological or medical in nature.  Since McCloskey (1999, p. 32; 2002, pp. 1, 49; 1998, p. 112; 
Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, p. 533) has tarred biology and medicine with the same brush as 
economics, we also performed searches in which “chemistry” and at least one of the keywords, 
but not “biology,” “biological,” “medicine,” or “medical,” should appear.  In addition, we 
performed keyword searches for 19 Anthropology journals, 57 History journals, 63 Language 
and Literature journals, and, for comparison, 39 Economics journals and, separately, the 
American Economic Review.   
  The search filter is obviously a crude one, but it does give some idea of the relative use of 
statistical significance in various disciplines.  The lowest rates of use are found in Language and 
Literature and in History.  Since most of the work published in these fields is not scientific in the 
way that term is typically understood, the fact that the hit rates are as high as 1 percent and 4 
percent is, perhaps surprising.  The highest rate is found in Economics, with a hit rate of 53 
percent.  Economics is a heavier user of this statistical apparatus than the other sciences 
examined.  McCloskey’s general impression that medicine and biology are relatively heavy users 
of statistical significance tests is also confirmed. 
  But what about the “hard” sciences?  They range from 8 percent for physics to 16 percent 
for cosmology.  Physics, when measured over the general science journals, uses keywords 
related to statistical significance at 8 percent measured over the general journals, but at 14 
percent, the same rate as chemistry, when measured over the Physical Review.   
  In reply to Ziliak and McCloskey, Horowitz (2004, p. 552) points out that physicists use 
the concept of statistical significance even if they do not use the name.  But the evidence shows 
that they do use the name.  Still, Horowitz’s observation underlines that our estimates are lower 
  26Siegler, “McCloskey and Significance Testing in Economics” 
evised, 27 November 2005 
 




Search for at least one statistical keyword         
and  but not  in  Hits  Total Articles  Ratio 
(percent) 
          
chemistry   
       
        
 
        
biology,  biological,
medicine, or medical 
7 General Science Journals     139    1,988    7 
physics    7 General Science Journals     348    4,127    8 
astronomy    7 General Science Journals       80       896    9 
geology    7 General Science Journals     156    1,447  11 
chemistry  biology or biological  7 General Science Journals     299    2,707  11 
chemistry 
 
  7 General Science Journals     948    6,828  14 
Physical Review  2,113 14,670 14
cosmology    7 General Science Journals       26       167  16 
    7 General Science Journals 
 
8,670  37,441  23 
biology 3,445 14,485 24
medicine 
 
    3,308    9,799  34 
American Economic Review     796    1,945  41 
    39 Economics Journals 
 
9,598  18,200  53 
Notes:  All searches except the Physical Review conducted on 3 June 2005 using the JSTOR Archive (http://www.jstor.org/).  A list of the journals in each 
category is found at the Browse link on the JSTOR website.  Searches of the Physical Review conducted on 20 July 2005 on the Physical Review Online Archive 
(http://prola.aps.org/).  Searches covered parts A-E, Special Topics:  Accelerator Beams, and Physical Review Letters.  A hit is indicated by the presence of the at 
least one of the statistical keywords as modified according to the terms of the first two columns.  The keywords are:  “statistically significant,” “statistical 
significance,” “significance test(s),” “test(s) of significance,” “t test,” “F test,” and “chi squared.”  All searches are for the years 1980-1999. 
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bounds on the real use of significance tests.  If we include “confidence level,” since confidence 
intervals, as we saw in section 2.3, are isomorphic to significance tests, the number of hits for the 
Physical Review rises to 3,820 or 26 percent. 
  McCloskey (1999, p. 357) offers a specific challenge: 
I invite you to look at a copy of the Physical Review (version C, say, the one about Nuclear 
Physics, the issue of November 1990, just as an example) and confirm that its 2,263 pages 
contain not a single use of . . . statistical significance . . .[emphasis added]  
 
Visual inspection of that issue of the Physical Review (which in fact runs from page R1791 
through 2270 – only 480 pages) shows that about 9 percent of the articles use keywords from the 
significance family.  One example is Southon et al. (1990, p. R1900):  “It should be noted, 
however, that attempts 5-8 to duplicate earlier d-d experiments revealed no statistically 
significant neutron fluxes above background” (emphasis added).  While substantially smaller 
than the rates for economics, the data flatly contradict the conclusion that such scientists 
“approximately never use tests of statistical significance.” 
  Are these examples of “real science”?  The titles displayed in Table 3 are an unsystematic 
sample that highlights the range of applications of statistical significance in the hard sciences.   
  How do physicists, chemists, and geologists use statistical significance?  Just like 
economists, if the papers cited in Table 3 are typical.  Significance tests are found most 
frequently in non-experimental contexts in which signals must be identified against background 
noise or in experimental contexts in which multiple observations of what are hypothesized to be 
the same phenomenon must be compared.  A particularly nice example is “An Experimental Test 
of the Inverse Square Law of Gravitation at Range of 0.1 m,” by Y.T. Chen, Alan H. Cook, and 
A.J.F. Metherell (1984, pp. 64).  The authors use tests of significance to evaluate a delicate 
laboratory experiment (an update of Cavendish’s famous torsion-pendulum experiment of 1798) 
aimed at testing whether the power on distance in the empirical law of gravitation is exactly 2 as 
predicted by Newton’s inverse-square law:  “The t-test has been applied to establish the 
significance of the difference between the observed and calculated values of  ΔF/F in two 
experiments.”  Further details are given in a table of t-tests (Table 7 of their paper), and these are 
used to assess the accuracy of the observed measurements.   
  The example is interesting, in part, because it illustrates the importance to physics of 
discrepancies too small to affect most practical applications.  The experiment aims to 
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Table 3 
Examples of Articles from the Physical Sciences that Use 
Statistical Significance from the 1980s and 1990s 
 
J.F. Ogilvie.  “A General Potential Energy Function for Diatomic Molecules,” Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London, Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, vol. 378, no. 1773, 8 
October 1981, pp. 287-300. 
Kathryn A. Whaler.  “Geomagnetic Secular Variation and Fluid Motion at the Core Surface,” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series A, Mathematical and 
Physical Sciences, vol. 306, no. 1492, The Earth’s Core:  Its Structure, Evolution and 
Magnetic Field, 20 August 1982, pp. 235-246. 
Y.T. Chen, Alan H. Cook, and A.J.F. Metherell, “An Experimental Test of the Inverse Square 
Law of Gravitation at Range of 0.1 m,”  Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series A, 
Mathematical and Physical Sciences, vol. 394, no. 1806, 9 July 1984, pp. 47-68. 
Jay D. Goguen and William M. Sinton.  “Characterization of Io’s Volcanic Activity by Infared 
Polarimetry,”  Science, new series, vol. 230, no. 4721, 4 October 1985, pp. 65-69. 
S. Singh et al. “Charge Stripping and Delayed Autoionization in Doubly Charged Ions of the 
Noble Gases,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series A, Mathematical and 
Physical Sciences, vol. 402, no. 1823, 9 December 1985, pp. 373-400. 
J.D. McDowell.  “New Physics from the CERN Collider,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
London, Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, vol. 404, no. 1827, Quarks and 
Leptons:  The New Elementary Particles?, 8 April 1986, pp. 213-232. 
Thomas K. Gaisser.  “Gamma Rays and Neutrinos as Clues to the Origin of High Energy Cosmic 
Rays,”  Science, new series, vol. 247, no. 4946, 2 March 1990, pp. 1049-1076. 
J.R. Southon, J.W. Stark, J.S. Vogel, and J.C. Waddington.  “Upper Limit for Neutron Emission 
from Cold d-t Fusion,” Physical Review C, vol. 41, November 1990, pp. R1899-R-1900. 
C.L. Bennett, et al. “Scientific Results from the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE),” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 90, no. 
11, 1 June 1993, pp. 4766-4773. 
M.J. Molina et al. “Physical Chemistry of the H2SO4/HNO3/H2O System:  Implications for Polar 
Stratospheric Clouds,” Science, new series, vol. 261, no. 5127, 10 September 1993, pp. 1418-
1423. 
C.J. Gilmore, K. Shankland, G. Bricogne.  “Applications of the Maximum Entropy Method to 
Powder Diffraction and Electron Crystallography,”  Proceedings:  Mathematical and Physical 
Sciences, vol. 442, no. 1914, 8 July 1993, pp. 97-111. 
Wendy L. Freedman.  “Measuring Cosmological Parameters,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 95, no. 1, 6 January 1998, pp. 2-7. 
Eric Gawiser and Joseph Silk.  “Extracting Primordial Density Fluctuations,” Science, new series, 
vol. 280, no. 5368, 28 May 1998, pp. 1405-1411. 
M.P. Bradley et al. “Penning Trap Measurements of the Masses of Cs, Rb, and Na with 
Uncertainties < 0.2 ppb,” Physical Review C, vol. 83, 4510-4513. 
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discriminate between theories in a domain in which their predictions are not practically different, 
but are nonetheless scientifically different.  How should these physicists define a loss function?   
  In this case, as in a number of other cases that we examined in detail, the researchers do 
not mistake the statistical significance or accuracy of the measurement for the significance of the 
physical measurement.  (As we argue in sections 4 and 5, there is little evidence that economists 
systematically commit this error either.)  But they do use tests of statistical significance as a 
measure of the strength of a signal relative to the noise.
17   
  Real science uses significance tests, but clearly there is a hierarchy in which physics and 
chemistry use them less frequently than cosmology, and much less frequently than biology, 
medicine, and economics.  The difference lies not in the legitimacy of significance tests as 
scientific tools, but in material differences among the disciplines.  Significance testing is used 
most in situations in which signal extraction is critical.  Such situations arise most frequently (as 
in cosmology or economics) when experimentation is not possible or in experimental situations 
(as with Chen et al.’s torsion-pendulum experiments) where effects are small and perfect 
shielding from disturbing influences impossible.   
  When significance tests are seen appropriately as measures of signal strength, 
Keuzenkamp and Magnus’s (1995, pp. 20-21) challenge to give an example of “a paper that 
contains significance tests which significantly changed the way that economists think about some 
proposition” appears to be rather beside the point (cf. McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, pp. 111-112).  
The statistical tests in Chen et al.’s torsion-pendulum experiments are used not to assess the 
theory of gravitation per se, but to assess the quality of the observations relative to the assumed 
statistical model.  The measurements contribute to the weight of evidence about the inverse-
square law, but no single measurement or experiment – and, therefore, no one test of statistical 
significance – is likely to be decisive.  The role of significance tests is a modest one.  Stigler 
(1999, pp. 364-365) reports that individual measures of the speed of light have not only varied 
through time but the confidence intervals around the different measures do not always overlap, 
much less converge.  He attributes this phenomenon (of which there are other examples) to the 
fact that simplified error models based on in-sample variability tell only part of the story, where 
often other sources of error prove to be more important (cf. McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, p. 112).  
                                                 
17 Additional evidence is found in Staley (2004), who discusses the use of significance tests in high-energy physics 
in considerable detail. 
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That other sources of error sometimes dominate statistical noise does not, however, warrant 
ignoring the noise nor does it militate against specification tests, which are tests of statistical 
significance used to detect errors – both statistical (such as departures from normality) and non-
statistical (such as structural breaks). 
  To understand that a measure of statistical significance does not of its nature decide for or 
against a substantive hypothesis does not mean either that the tests are useless or that empirical 
evidence in which they play a key role is not influential.  Dominant professional opinion has 
shifted with respect to many economic phenomena based on accumulated empirical evidence:  
for example, with respect to the interest elasticity of the demand for money, the nature of the 
Phillips curve, or the stickiness of aggregate prices.  Papers that used tests of statistical 
significance as tools to assess the accuracy of their measurements relative to the assumed model 
of the errors, contributed to the weight of the evidence in these cases.  Economics is no different 
from physics in this regard.   
 
4. Do Econometrics Textbooks Mislead Students? 
Up to now we have concentrated on McCloskey’s wider criticisms of tests of statistical 
significance.  Yet, we do not doubt that there are instances in which both students and 
professional economists have failed to distinguish between statistical and economic significance.  
The important questions are:  How frequently do economists make this error?  And do they make 
it out of negligence or through misapprehension?  McCloskey and Ziliak (1996; also Ziliak and 
McCloskey 2004a) address these questions along two paths.  First, they argue that econometrics 
textbooks provides evidence of a pedagogical failure.  Second, they use their two reviews of the 
articles on applied economics in the American Economic Review to quantify economists’ errors 
with respect to significance testing.  We begin with the question of pedagogy and will take up the 
surveys in the next section. 
  In McCloskey and Ziliak’s (1996, pp. 99-101) view, students of econometrics have been 
systematically misled by its textbooks.  With few exceptions, the distinction between economic 
and statistical significance is never drawn.  Statistics textbooks that are typically used in courses 
prerequisite to econometrics also fail to draw the distinction. 
  We share the view that econometrics instruction, at least as represented in mainstream 
textbooks, fails to address or, relative to some earlier textbooks, has abandoned discussions of 
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many practical issues that arise in applied economics – discussion of the distinction between 
economic and statistical significance is just one among many.  Econometrics textbooks have 
come over time to place more emphasis on estimators, their properties, and statistical theory (see 
Hoover 2004).  One may well question the wisdom of this turn to formalism.  But is it a sin?  Or 
is it rather – at least in part – an example of the division of labor?  Neither statistics nor 
econometrics textbooks can be held responsible for the complete education of the applied 
econometrician.  For the most part, McCloskey and Ziliak attack the textbooks for sins of 
omission rather than commission.  It is rather like attacking a grocery for not selling cars. 
  Nowhere does McCloskey provide evidence of an economist or an author of an 
econometrics textbook who provides a principled argument in favor of the equivalence of 
economic and statistical significance.  To conjure a sin of commission, McCloskey is forced to 
argue that the textbooks provide deleterious examples.  The single case of Jack Johnston’s 
Econometric Methods (1972) provides the principal evidence (McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, p. 
100, McCloskey 1998, p. 117).  Johnston uses a set of data on casualties in road accidents in the 
United Kingdom and vehicle registrations.
18  McCloskey’s analysis is a study in careless 
reading.
19   
  McCloskey reads Johnston as if he were offering a serious analysis of a policy, when he 
is clearly illustrating how to make certain statistical calculations.  The data are an 11-period time 
series taken from the econometrics paper of the Oxford University undergraduate examination in 
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics in 1959.  Such data are hardly meant to be taken seriously 
for economic analysis, and Johnston uses them only to illustrate how to calculate regression 
coefficients, standard errors, and confidence intervals, as well as how to perform the analysis of 
variance (all a reminder of how recently the calculation of statistics by hand was the norm).   
 
                                                 
18 McCloskey and Ziliak (1996, p. 100) report this example as “spanning pages 17 to 43” and McCloskey (1998, p. 
117) as “extending over twenty-six pages [sic].”  The first use of the data does occur on page 17 and the last on page 
43.  The pages in between are mostly given over to a theoretical exposition of regression, confidence intervals, 
correlation, and hypothesis testing, in which the data are used to illustrate calculations on pp. 17-18, 37-38, and 42-
43, taking up just about three pages of equivalent text out of twenty-seven.   
19 This claim is extensively documented in an earlier version of this paper, available on the World Wide Web at 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/kdhoover/research.htm  
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5. Are Economists Confused About Statistical Significance? 
5.1 THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TWO SURVEYS 
If the evidence that econometrics textbooks actually teach error is thin, are economists 
nonetheless confused or negligent with respect to statistical significance in their practice?   
McCloskey and Ziliak address this question with their two surveys of papers in the American 
Economic Review in the 1980s and the 1990s.  Of the 1980s survey they say:  “We take the full-
length papers published in the American Economic Review as an unbiased selection of best 
practice. . . We read all the 182 papers in the 1980s that used regression analysis” (McCloskey 
and Ziliak 1996, p. 101, emphasis added).  They indicate that the 1990s survey applies the same 
criterion, but also say that they survey “the 137 papers using a test of statistical significance” 
(Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, pp. 527, 528, emphasis added).   
  In fact, their surveys do not cover all the papers indicated.  Our own examination of the 
full-length articles in the American Economic Review shows that McCloskey and Ziliak omitted 
20 percent of the potentially eligible papers:  15 papers in the 1980s and 56 papers in the 1990s 
meeting both criteria (regression analysis and tests of statistical significance); 5 papers in the 
1980s and 5 in the 1990s that used statistical significance without regression analysis; and one 
paper (in the 1990s) that used regression analysis but not statistical significance.
20
  McCloskey and Ziliak’s survey instrument is shown in Table 1.  Its nineteen questions 
are a hodge-podge, addressing questions far broader than the original, narrow one:  do 
economists mistake economic and statistical significance?  Although a case might be made for 
some of the broader practices surveyed contributing to the primary mistake of confusing 
economic and statistical significance, the connection is often tangential.   
  McCloskey and Ziliak report the results of the survey of the 1980s as percentages 
answering “yes” to each question.  That is unexceptionable.  But the 1990s survey is more 
ambitious.  Each author is scored by the number of affirmative answers to the survey questions, 
and authors grouped into ranges from best to worst practice (Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, Table 
4).
21  Scoring in itself implies that McCloskey and Ziliak believe that it makes sense to compare 
performance across authors, and Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a) do not flinch from intertemporal 
                                                 
20 Sometimes individual articles are overlooked, and in two cases whole issues – particularly 1999(4)and 1999(5), 
which between them include eleven empirical papers meeting the relevant criteria.  A complete list of the omitted 
papers with annotations to the criteria of inclusion can be found at:  
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/kdhoover/research.htm
21 It is unclear why Ziliak and McCloskey chose to group authors in ranges rather than to report individual scores.   
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comparisons as well:  “significance testing is getting worse” (pp. 527, 529).  Such comparisons 
immediately raise methodological questions. 
  What is the metric on which authors are compared?  Even to add up a score is to imply 
that each question bears an equal weight.  Yet, the questions themselves reflect a hodge-podge of 
practices:  some indicate truly good practices (e.g., questions 4, 13, 19), although not ones that 
can be judged without interpretation; others reflect personal preferences that may be desirable 
but do not have any logically necessary connection to the confusion of economic and statistical 
significance (e.g., questions 2, 3, 5); others describe practices that are desirable in some contexts 
but not others (e.g., questions 6, 8, 10, 11, 17); while others – depending on how they are 
interpreted in practice – may not reflect good practice at all (e.g., questions 1, discussed in 
section 2.2 above, and 14, discussed in section 2.5 above).  In any case, they cannot be 
reasonably equally weighted.   
  And some questions are redundant, which permits doubling counting and, therefore, 
unequal weighting of an arbitrary kind.  To ask whether an author confuses economic and 
statistical significance at the “crescendo” of the article (question 7), after the “crescendo” 
(question 15), and in the conclusion (question 18) is akin to asking whether he makes the error 
on p. 1, p. 2, p. 3. . . p. n and then treating each as an independent error, turning one mistake into 
several.  The error may be a particularly important one, but the implicit weighting method bears 
no stable relation to its importance. 
  McCloskey and Ziliak conclude from their surveys not just that the authors of the articles 
in the American Economic Review, but that the “supermajority of economists” (McCloskey and 
Ziliak 2004b, p. 668) misunderstand the difference between statistical and economic significance 
(cf. McCloskey 1999, p. 361; 2002, p. 52; McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, p. 111; Ziliak and 
McCloskey 2004a, p. 530).  And that the problem is getting worse.  Given McCloskey’s 
objections to “samples of convenience” and skepticism about hypothetical populations, such 
comparisons and extrapolations are illegitimate by McCloskey’s own lights.  If tests of statistical 
significance cannot be applied to 19
th-century data on purchasing power parity, because the 19
th 
century comprises the whole population, while the 20
th century comprises a different population, 
then meaningful comparisons between the practices of economists in the 1980s and 1990s are 
equally out of court.  The point does not hinge on statistical significance itself, but on whether 
two groups of data can be situated as parts of larger populations – ones that may have as yet 
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unobserved members.  McCloskey denies the validity of the comparison abstractly, and yet in 
practice she contradicts her professions and draws inferences from the comparison.  She can 
hardly help doing so, since the point is supposed to be about the underlying behavior of the 
economics profession, the mechanism – for which the raw facts are merely evidence, not an end 
in themselves. 
  If such comparisons are legitimate, then questions arise:  is an increase in the number of 
authors assigned “no” for question 16 from 70 percent in the 1980s to 82 percent in the 1990s a 
genuine increase in the underlying probabilities of committing an error or simply random 
variation attributable to unstable and uncontrollable factors?  This is, of course, exactly the sort 
of question that motivated Edgeworth and others to develop tests of statistical significance in the 
first place. 
  The questions in the two surveys for the most part involve a subjective element.  What is 
the “crescendo” of an article (question 15)?  What constitutes a “conversation stopper” (question 
16)?  What is a “proper” null (question 4)?  When are coefficients interpreted “carefully” 
(question 5)?  Subjectivity alone does not rule out scientific or reproducible procedures.   
Psychologists and sociologists have considered the problem of how to “objectify” subjective 
observations  of, for example, conversations between husbands and wives (Eye and Mun 2004 
provide a methodological discussion for psychologists).  Generally, these procedures require a 
period of training and a calibration between different observers or for the same observer 
operating at different times.  Clearly, consistency in reading and scoring different articles would 
be critical in any such survey – especially if the data from a later survey are to be compared 
sensibly to those of an earlier one.   
  The group of questions that deal directly with the confusion of economic with statistical 
significance is particularly problematic.  Is an author scored as making an error if, in the same 
sentence (or paragraph) that he indicates statistical significance, he does not also refer to 
economic significance?  Is he automatically scored as making an error if he omits the adjectives 
statistical or economic in front of significance?  The only way to answer such questions would be 
to know what protocols McCloskey and Ziliak followed in scoring the papers.  And the best way 
to know such protocols would be have the records of the mapping that indicate precisely which 
passages in the text warrant particular judgments with respect to each question.   
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  Unfortunately, Ziliak has informed us that such records do not exist.  And McCloskey 
and Ziliak declined our requests to reconstruct these mappings retrospectively for a random 
selection of the articles (e-mail McCloskey to Hoover 11 February 2005).  Absent such 
information, including any description of procedures for calibrating and maintaining consistency 
of scoring between the two surveys, we cannot assess the quality of the scoring or the 
comparability between the surveys. 
  McCloskey’s reason for not sharing the mappings appears to be, first, that they are utterly 
transparent and, second, that the relevant information is contained in the scores themselves: 
Think of astronomers disagreeing.  We have supplied you with the photographic plates 
with which we arrived at our conclusions [i.e., the question-by-question scores for the 
1990 survey]. . . The stars [i.e., the articles in the American Economic Review] are still 
there, too, for you to observe independently. [e-mail McCloskey to Hoover 19 February 
2005]  
 
It is surprising that a professor of English (as McCloskey is in addition to being a professor of 
economics), who should be sensitive to the wiles of language, could believe that the 
interpretation of texts, even of economics texts, is mechanical and not subject to variations in 
judgment and perspective that would require regulation and calibration to be consistent across 
different observers and that would remain debatable in all cases.   
  Take, for example, the apparently straightforward question 8:  “Does the paper mention 
the power of the tests?”  But is it enough that the word “power” appear?  Presumably, only if it 
refers to statistics.  But what about variants such as “forecasting power” that usually do not refer 
directly to statistical tests, but are closely allied to them, such that they could be recast as 
references to type II error?  What about circumlocutions that address the issues of type II error 
without actually mentioning it or power directly?  These are questions of interpretation that are 
best revealed from the detailed mappings and that are not revealed at all from the scores.  
  The necessity of interpretation shows that the analogy with astronomy is utterly false.  
The scores are the equivalent of an astronomer making rather refined calculations taking 
photographic plates of the stars as the raw data.  These plates, naturally, require interpretation.  
The astronomer then publishes the calculations in a table, reaching a conclusion important for 
astronomy.  Another astronomer, who wants to understand more fully the published results, asks 
the first astronomer to see the plates.  To which the first astronomer replies, “Why, I have shown 
you my tables of data – they are in the published paper – and the heavens themselves are in full 
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view.  What more could you need?”  But, of course, that misses the point.  The plates, not the 
heavens, are the astronomer’s data.  And while there could be interest in another astronomer 
doing it all from scratch, there is a perfectly reasonable scientific interest, and a much honored 
scientific tradition, in seeing the data that were actually generated – that is, the plates 
(analogously the mappings from texts to scores) themselves. 
 
 
5.2 CASE STUDIES 
The substantive difficulties of interpretation can be made more vivid through in-depth case 
studies.  We have examined every article that McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) and Ziliak and 
McCloskey (2004a) discuss individually in the body of their texts, as opposed to ones that are 
merely scored for their surveys.  In the interest of space we comment on five – two from the 
survey of the 1980s and three from the 1990s.  We focus on the main issue:  does the author 
confuse statistical and economic significance?  Our choices are not random; they reflect articles 
that we believe illustrate clearly the flaws in McCloskey and Ziliak’s analysis.  But neither are 
they intentionally biased.  McCloskey and Ziliak single out each one for special criticism, and 
each one scores low in their surveys.
22  Our approach is holistic in the sense that we concentrate 
on what a reasonable reader would take away from the paper at the end of the day and not, for 
example, on whether or not the adjectives “statistical” and “economic” qualify “significance” in 
particular instances.   
 
  Darby (1984):  “The U.S. Productivity Slowdown:  A Case of Statistical Myopia” 
Of Michael Darby’s article, McCloskey and Ziliak (1996, p. 104) write: 
The misuse in Michael Darby (1984) is balder [than in Romer and Sachs 1980]:  his only 
argument for a coefficient when he runs a regression is its statistical significance (pp. 311, 
315), but on the other hand his findings do not turn on the regression results.  
 
                                                 
22 For the 1980s, there are 182 articles.  Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) scored 7 out of 19 and ranked the 41
st 
percentile of papers in the 1980s (i.e., 41 percent scored 7 or less).  Darby (1984) scored either 2 or 3 and is in the 8
th 
or 4
th percentile (the latter a seven-way tie for last place).  The ambiguity arises because McCloskey and Ziliak’s 
score sheet reports 3 yes and 17 no for Darby’s article, but there are only 19 questions.  For the 1990s, there are 137 
articles.  Bernanke and Blinder (1992) scores 8 (58
th percentile); Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) scores 6 
(30
th percentile); Bernheim and Wantz (1995) scores 1 (last place and the 1
st percentile).  
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  Darby (1984, p. 301) hypothesizes that the sharp slowdown in measured productivity in 
the 1970s is the result of demographic changes that, when accounted for appropriately, eliminate 
any secular decline in the growth rate of technical progress.  Darby comments on the (statistical) 
significance of regressors in his equation (11) and performs F-tests of various sets of zero 
restrictions (Table 6, p. 311).  This specification exercise suggests his final specification 
(equation (12), p. 311).  Darby uses statistical significance as a measure of the precision of his 
estimates (for example, as indicating that “no direct effect [of oil-price increases on productivity] 
is directly detectable” (p. 311), but nowhere does he confuse the measures of statistical 
significance with the economic meaning of the equation.  For example, immediately following 
equation (12) he considers  
the implications of this equation for the level of productivity in the year 1973.  The average 
value of CDt [a price-control variable] in 1973 is 0.7857 which . . . implies that the 
logarithm of labor productivity in 1973 was overstated by 0.0369.  This means that the 
1965-73 growth rates of private labor productivity are overstated by 3.69/8 = 0.46 percent 
per annum and correspondingly that the 1973-79 growth rates are understated by 3.69/6 = 
0.61 per annum. . . applying this adjustment to the quality-adjusted growth rates . . . 
eliminates any evidence of a major 1973-79 productivity slowdown.  [p. 311]  
 
Whether the argument is right or wrong, the reasoning is about the economic size of the 
coefficients as they relate to the question of interest, the productivity slowdown; and, far from 
not turning on the regression results, they depend in detail on the coefficient estimates.   
Statistical significance is not invoked as settling the question of economic interest.
23
 
Woodbury and Spiegelman:  “Bonuses to Workers and Employers to Reduce 
Unemployment:  Randomized Trials in Illinois” 
Quoting the following passage, McCloskey and Ziliak (1996, pp. 107; cf. McCloskey 1998, pp. 
132-134) accuse Stephen A. Woodbury and Robert G. Spiegelman (1987) of “not thinking about 
the economic meaning of a coefficient”: 
The fifth panel also shows that the overall benefit-cost ratio for the Employer Experiment 
is 4.29, but it is not statistically different from zero.  The benefit-cost ratio for white 
women in the Employer Experiment, however, is 7.07, and is statistically different from 
zero.  Hence, a program modeled on the Employer Experiment also might be attractive 
from the state’s point of view if the program did not increase unemployment among 
                                                 
23 An additional reference to statistical significance (Darby 1984, p. 315) essentially states that a change in 
specification did not result in an estimate of the coefficient on CDt outside its confidence interval in equation (12), 
therefore not triggering any reassessment of the economic interpretation of that equation. 
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nonparticipants.  Since, however, the Employer Experiment affected only white women, it 
would be essential to understand the reasons for the uneven effects of the treatment on 
different groups of workers before drawing conclusions about the efficacy of such a 
program. [Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987, p. 527; emphasis added]  
 
McCloskey and Ziliak (1996, p. 108) gloss “affected” as  
the estimated coefficient is statistically significantly different from a value the authors 
believe to be the relevant one.  The 4.29 benefit-cost ratio for the whole Employment 
Experiment is, according to the authors, not useful or important for public policy.  The 
7.07 ratio for white women is said to “affect” – to be important – because it passed an 
arbitrary significance test. . . The argument that the 4.29 figure does not “affect” is 
unsound, and could be costly in employment forgone.  
 
  While we would agree that “affect” is a poorly chosen word – at least for those who are 
intent on finding a confusion between economic and statistical significance – we find no 
evidence in this passage of a mistake in logic.  Much of the conclusion of Woodbury and 
Spiegelman’s (1987, pp. 528-529) article is devoted to the economic  significance of their 
coefficient estimates.  For example:  “The results of the Claimant Experiment are unequivocal 
and strong.  The incentive created by the $500 bonus . . . reduced state regular benefits . . . by an 
average of $158, and reduced . . . insured unemployment by more than one week . . .” 
(Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987, p. 528).  The gravaman of McCloskey and Ziliak’s charge is 
that Woodbury and Spiegelman dismiss the economic importance of the overall estimate.  But 
that conclusion relies on an uncharitable, decontextualized, and wooden reading of the article.   
  Woodbury and Spiegelman present estimates of both the overall ratio and that for four 
component groups (white women, white men, black women, and black men).  The difference 
between the insignificant overall ratio and the significant ratio for white women suggests that 
either the number of experimental subjects in three of the categories is too small to get a precise 
estimate or that they belong to distinct populations.  Would McCloskey and Ziliak have them 
apply the overall ratio to white women, because they are part of the whole, even though the 
specific ratio for white women is much more precisely estimated and economically quite 
different from the overall ratio?  Or would McCloskey and Ziliak divide the population into its 
component groups and rely on the individual group estimates of benefit-cost ratios?  The first 
choice simply ignores the evidence that the data are not drawn from a homogeneous population; 
the second commits the licorice-jelly-bean mistake of section 2.2.   
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  Woodbury and Spiegelman instead recognize that a) the data are not homogeneous and b) 
some of the components are too noisily measured to draw firm conclusions.  They do not (pace 
McCloskey and Ziliak) use statistical insignificance to advocate ignoring these groups for policy 
purposes.  Instead, they note the need for further study:  “it would be essential to understand the 
reasons for the uneven effects of the treatment on different groups of workers [estimated benefit 
cost-ratios that differ by factors as large as 44 as well as different levels of statistical 
significance] before drawing conclusions about the efficacy of such a program” (Woodbury and 
Spiegelman’s 1987, p. 527)  While they do not provide additional analysis of this issue, earlier 
they provided a careful economic – not statistical – analysis of the difference of the differences 
by race and sex in the receipt of, qualification for, and take-up rates of bonuses, which illustrates 
the type of analysis that they probably have in mind (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987, pp. 523-
527).  The authors provide abundant evidence of sensitivity to the distinction between economic 
and statistical significance, and do not make the specific mistake that McCloskey and Ziliak 
attribute to them.   
 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992):  “The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary 
Transmission”  
By “asterisk econometrics” (question 10), McCloskey and Ziliak (1996, p. 103) mean “ranking 
the coefficients according to the absolute size of t-statistics.”  Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p. 
534) interpret the question more broadly as covering any hierarchy or grouping of p-, F-, and t-
statistics.  Surely, the question is not how this information is conveyed, but what information is 
supplied and what is needed.  The mere fact of presenting a ranking does not imply a confusion 
of economic and statistical significance.  Frequently, the information included in asterisked 
tables is rich enough to permit readers to examine the data more fully.  For example, a common 
form presents a coefficient estimate and either a t-statistic (against the null of zero) or a standard 
error.  From this information, one can construct confidence intervals (favored by McCloskey) or 
tests with other nulls (see section 2.3 above).  If an author also indicates significance through 
asterisks, p-values, or other means, the additional information cannot be bad in itself, but only if 
it is misused. 
  Is it misused?  Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p. 234) cite Ben S. Bernanke and Alan S. 
Blinder (1992, pp. 905 and 909) as clear practitioners of “asterisk econometrics.”  But what we 
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see is something different.  Bernanke and Blinder conduct Granger-causality tests, which ask 
whether the lagged values of a variable contain incremental information about another variable.  
The natural test is an F-test that measures whether the exclusion of the lags of the first variable 
results in a statistically significant increase in the standard error of regression.  The statistical 
evidence that one variable Granger-causes another does not imply that it is an important 
determinant, but only that its signal rises measurably above the noise according to a conventional 
threshold.  The question that Granger-causality addresses, whether a conditional distribution is 
different from a marginal distribution cannot even be addressed through coefficient estimates 
without standard errors; for it is a question about the statistical distribution, not about the mean.  
The tables that Ziliak and McCloskey identify as demonstrating asterisk econometrics do not 
present F-statistics in a hierarchy (they are not rank ordered, and there are no asterisks), but they 
do present evidence relevant to Granger-causality.  What is more, Bernanke and Blinder do not 
confuse economic and statistical significance in interpreting this evidence.  Their table is part of 
an analysis that is ultimately evaluated in terms of an economically meaningful standard:  the 
fraction of the variance of various real variables that is predicted by various currently observed 
variables (see their Tables 2 and 4).   
 
  Bernheim and Wantz:  “A Tax-Based Test of the Dividend Signaling Hypothesis” 
Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p. 535) also accuse B. Douglas Bernheim and Adam Wantz 
(1995) of practicing asterisk econometrics.  Yet the table that they cite of Bernheim and Wantz 
(1995, p. 547) does not rank its test statistics, and the only asterisk indicates an alternative 
scenario and not a significance level.  The question that Bernheim and Wantz address is again 
not one of coefficient values, but of the timing of regime changes, for which a test of whether 
data from possibly different regimes could have been generated by the same model is 
appropriate.  The interest in the timing of regime changes is perfectly consistent with a concern 
for economic magnitudes, which they address with the “bang-for-buck” ratios calculated later in 
the paper.   
  In addition to asterisk econometrics, Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p.534) also accuse 
Bernheim and Wantz (1995) of practicing “sign econometrics” (question 11); that is “remarking 
on the sign but not the size of the coefficient. . .” (Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, p. 534; cf. 
McCloskey and Ziliak 1996, p. 103).  Contrary to McCloskey and Ziliak, “sign econometrics” is 
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not an error in every case.  If a coefficient is badly measured, then its sign is also badly 
determined.
24  But if it is well measured, the sign sometimes matters as well as, or more than, the 
absolute magnitude.  Whether I am a minute off the departure time for my train is much more 
costly if I am late than if I am early.  An error occurs only if an inference is made that depends 
on the absolute magnitude instead of, or in addition to, the sign.  The objection to “sign 
econometrics” stands in an uneasy relationship to question 5 (Table 1), which demands 
theoretical interpretation of coefficients.  Theory often has something definite to say about 
direction, while agnostic on absolute value. 
  To illustrate “sign econometrics,” Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p. 534) quote Bernheim 
and Wantz (1995, p. 543) who “report that ‘the coefficients [in four regressions on their crucial 
variable, high-rated bonds] {Ziliak and McCloskey’s interpolation} are all negative . . . 
However, the estimated values of these coefficients,’ they remark, ‘are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels of confidence.’”  The quotation appears to support Ziliak and 
McCloskey’s point only because it is selective and taken out of context.  Bernheim and Wantz 
(1995, p. 543) make only a passing remark on the signs of the coefficients from which no 
inferences are drawn; and, in the sentence immediately following the quoted one, they say, 
“More significant effects – both economically and statistically – are found in Table 2” (emphasis 
added).  Two paragraphs later they discuss the economic magnitudes of the precisely estimated 
bang-for-buck ratios derived from their estimates.   
 
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994):  “An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction”  
Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p. 540) are particularly proud to criticize Gary S. Becker, Michael 
Grossman, and Kevin M. Murphy (1994) :   
you can see that we are anxious not to be accused of making our lives easy by picking on 
the less eminent economic scientists. . . Sign econometrics and asterisk econometrics 
decide nearly everything in the paper, but most importantly the “existence” of addiction.   
 
                                                 
24 Ziliak and McCloskey’s position is not fully consistent.  We agree that “a poorly fit correlation with the expected 
sign would say nothing” (Ziliak and McCloskey 2004a, p. 539).  Yet, they intended the inaccurately reported aspirin 
example to show that the size of the measured effect matters even when estimates are statistically insignificant.  And 
if the “oomph” matters, so does its direction.  McCloskey would surely advocate a different policy if the correlation 
between aspirin and heart attacks were positive, though statistically insignificant. 
  40Hoover and Siegler, “McCloskey and Significance Testing in Economics” 
Revised, 27 November 2005 
  Once again, the charges are unsupported by the evidence.  The central analysis is about 
the economic, not the statistical, significance of the data.  Right in the introduction, Becker et 
al.(1994, pp. 396-397) summarize their findings:   
a 10-percent increase in the price of cigarettes reduces current consumption by 4 percent in 
the short run and by 7.5 percent in the long run.  In contrast, a 10-percent increase in price 
for only one period decreases consumption by only 3 percent.  These estimates illustrate 
the importance of the intertemporal linkages in cigarette demand implied by addictive 
behavior.  
 
Not a word about statistical significance.  The only way in which this passage falls short of what 
McCloskey advocates is that the authors do not add, “And, wow, that is a big effect!”   
 Becker  et al.’s primary goal is to distinguish between two hypotheses:  myopic addiction 
and rational addiction.  Their claim is that the key empirical distinction is between a positive and 
a zero coefficient on the future consumption term.  Here sign, rather than size, is of the essence.  
Statistical significance matters because the authors will place faith only in evidence garnered 
from measurements that rise above the statistical noise.  Their purpose is a scientific one (is one 
theory more likely to be correct or not?) rather than an engineering one (what can I do with this 
measurement?).  But (pace McCloskey and Ziliak) they indicate clearly the relevance of their 
results for government regulation and revenues (p. 397), leaving it to the policymakers to work 
out the details in relationship to their own ends.  What is big depends on the purposes, but the 
facts about the world are what they are whatever one’s purposes.  The scientist tries to point to 
the facts; the policymaker must use them. 
  Ziliak and McCloskey’s (2004a, p. 541) central claim that Becker et al. confuse 
economic and statistical significance is simply false, although they admit that “[e]ventually 
[Becker  et al.] report (though they never interpret) the estimated magnitudes of the price 
elasticities of demand for cigarettes” (p. 541).
25  Y e s ,  B e c k e r  et al. use tests of statistical 
significance to measure the precision of estimates.  But with respect to their main empirical 
results (reported in their Table 3), they immediately follow it with the calculation of elasticities 
and a careful discussion of what they imply for the effects of changes in cigarette prices (Becker 
                                                 
25 Ziliak and McCloskey (2004a, p. 541) continue:  “But their way of finding the elasticities is erroneous.”  The 
charge is never substantiated by pointing out the particular errors.  Be that as it may, whether Becker et al. are right 
or wrong on this point has no bearing on the central question of whether they confuse economic and statistical 
significance. 
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et al. 1994, p. 407).  This discussion is entirely economic with no further references to statistical 
significance.
26  It is this economic evidence that is used to assess the competing theories: 
Clearly, the estimates indicate that cigarettes are addictive, that past and future changes 
significantly impact current consumption.  This evidence is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that cigarette consumers are myopic.  Still, the estimates are not fully consistent 
with rational addiction, because the point estimates of the discount factor (β) are 
implausibly low . . . correspond[ing] to interest rates ranging from 56.3 percent to 226.6 
percent. [Becker et al. 1994, p. 407]  
 
Since the estimates referred to are those of the immediately preceding paragraph, which do not 
refer to tests of statistical significance, “significantly” is naturally interpreted here as referring to 
the magnitude of the effect and not its relationship to its standard error.  That Becker et al. take 
these economic magnitudes to be the relevant ones is reinforced by the implications for interest 
rates, the calculations of which rely on point estimates and which are judged by their economic 
plausibility.  In what sense, then, can Becker et al. be said to “never interpret” their estimates? 
  One hint of an answer is Ziliak and McCloskey’s (2004a, p. 541) assertion, “[c]igarette 
smoking may be addictive.  But Becker, Grossman, and Murphy have not shown why, or how 
much.”  If “why” is taken to mean what mechanism causes smokers to be addicted, of course 
they have not shown why.  That is a physiological question, and not one that they sought to 
address.  Their article addresses a different question:  can the behavior of smokers be seen as 
consistent with a myopic or a rational model of addiction?  Whether or not their conclusions are 
correct, the evidence that they muster does in fact bear on this question.  If “how much” is taken 
to mean some measure of the intensity of the addiction, they leave that measurement implicit in 
their estimates.  For that too does not have direct bearing on the question of interest.  They do 
draw out the implications of their estimates for the discrimination between competing models 
and for elasticities relevant to public policy.  They clearly provide an economic interpretation of 
the significance of their estimates. 
 
6. Apocalypse Now? 
McCloskey’s analysis of the state of significance testing in economics is apocalyptic: 
                                                 
26 A similar discussion of a different specification, couched in economic terms, is found on p. 408.  And, despite 
Ziliak and McCloskey’s having scored Becker et al., as not conducting any simulations, a small simulation is 
reported on p. 409. 
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Econometric testing, as against estimation, is not worth anything at all.  Its marginal 
product is zero. [McCloskey 1997, p. 242]   
Almost all econometric fittings have to be done over again.  All of them. . . all the work of 
the elders has been wasted. . . Eminent statisticians and many econometricians declare 
statistical significance to be bankrupt.  Yet scientific practice does not change at all. 
[McCloskey 1997, p. 361]   
 
And her advice has the direct simplicity of the Old Testament prophet:   
You go figure.  But when figuring don’t use statistical significance. [McCloskey 1997, p. 
361]  
 
Our message is this:  Take comfort, things are not so dark as all that. 
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